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DeYoung: ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial Approach to a Bank's Liability

Notes
ATM CRIME: EXPANDING THE JUDICIAL
APPROACH TO A BANK'S LIABILITY
FOR THIRD PARTY CRIMES
AGAINST ATM PATRONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Douglas Lane stopped at an automated teller machine' to get some money
before his Saturday night date.' As he conducted his transaction, a teenager in
a T-shirt and baggy jeans walked up to the ATM. 3 The teenager leaned against
the wall behind Lane and took a drag on his cigarette. 4 As Lane withdrew $100
from his account, the teenager approached the ATM and put a semiautomatic
pistol to Lane's head and led him from the machine. 5 Lane was later found
dead, with four bullet holes in his chest. 6
Since the introduction of ATMs in the late 1960s,7 eye-catching headlines
like the 1993 Los Angeles incident described above have drawn attention to the
security and safety of ATMs.' While ATMs have given bank customers

1. Hereinafter referred to as ATM.
2. Miles Corwin, Brutality of Today's Crimes Bewilders Veteran Convicts Violence, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1993, Home Edition §, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Pamela Samuels, Automated Teller Machine Crime: Are Banks Liable For Personal
Injuries?, 11 Legal Research Guides 1 (1990); Joan Miles, Note, Automated Teller Machine
Robberies: Theories of Liability, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 171 n.5 (1985-86) (reporting that
one of the first ATM machines was installed in the U.S. in 1969 in New York City by Chemical
Bank).
8. See Vivian Marino, High-Tech ATM Thieves Try to Pin Liability on You, With Bank
Machine's Convenience Comes the Risk of Getting Ripped Off, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1993, Your
Money §, at 3; see also Richard Perez-Pena, BystandersJoin to Trap Robber at an East Side Cash
Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at AS; Thomas Huang, Living with Fear,CHI. TRIB., Feb.
16, 1994, at 7; Michael Martinez & Jerry Thornton, Man Held in Slaying After ATM Robbery, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 1993, at 6; Rebecca Cox, Are Automated Tellers Also Automatic Threats?, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 5, 1989, at 11; William Gruber, Security at ATMs is Under Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 28, 1989, Business §, at 2; Ira Lipman, Are ATMs Really as Safe as We Like to Think?, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 10, 1984, at 24; Joanna Sullivan, Banks PushingATM Safety Legislation, BALTIMORE
Bus. J., Feb. 4, 1994, at 4 (stating that "ATM security is an issue sweeping the nation"). Sullivan
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around-the-clock access to their bank accounts, this convenience has subjected
ATM users to the criminal actions of third parties. 9 Since crimes perpetrated
against ATM customers occur on bank property, a new type of premises owner
liability is developing, that of bank liability for ATM crimes."
Injured
customers are filing tort claims against banks for negligence in failing to protect
patrons against crime at ATMs." The extent of a bank's duty to protect ATM
customers from injury caused by the intentional acts of third parties is a question
courts are being asked to answer. 2
Traditionally, premises owners did not have a duty to protect invitees from
the intentional acts of third persons.' 3 However, the recognition of a "special

recounts several incidents in Baltimore in which ATM customers were forced to withdraw money.
Id.
9. See generally Miles, supra note 7, at 171-72. Miles reports that according to a survey of
banks, ATM customers at 2.5 percent of the responding banks had been robbed. Id. at 172 n.6
(citing Office of Technology Assessment of the Congress of the United States, Selected Electronic
Funds Transfer Issues: Privacy, Security and Equity 49-50 (1982)). In addition to robberies,
occurrences of bombings, muggings, torchings and shootings at ATMs have also been reported. Id.
(citing Zimmer, ATMs in 1983: A CriticalAssessment, MAG. OF BANK ADMIN., May 1984, at 32)).
See also infra note 11 (listing cases filed by injured ATM victims against banks).
10. See generally Philip E. Strok, Comment, "Hi, My Name is Bob, I'll Be YourRobber, "Bank
Liabilityfor CriminalActivity atAutomated Teller Machines, 22 Sw. U. L. REV 483, 483-84 (1993).
For purposes of this note, ATM crime will refer to criminal activity occurring at ATMs and
will be used as equivalent to ATM torts. While a tort is not necessarily equivalent to a crime, this
note will discuss the potential of a bank's liability for injuries resulting in civil actions in tort rather
than the potential criminal liability. An ATM crime has been defined as "any crime of violence or
threatened violence in which the perpetrator[s] saw the victim use an ATM, or in which the attack
occurred within 20 feet of an ATM." BANK ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTE, ATM SECURITY
HANDBOOK 28-29 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter BAIl.
11. Williams v. First Alabama Bank, 545 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1989); Page v. American Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Dyer v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 588
N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1993);*Popp v. Cash
Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150 (I11.App. Ct. 1992); Fuga v. Comerica Bank of Detroit, 509
N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Faulkner v. Sun Bank of S. Florida, 532 So. 2d 1293 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Gillen v. Delaware Trust Co., 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 332 (1993);
Oppenheimer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984), cited in Harry H. Lipsig, Ton
Trends: Duty of Banks to Safeguard Customers, N.Y.L.J., Oct., 25, 1984, at 1; Stalzer v. European
American Bank, 113 Misc. 2d 77 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
12. See supra note 11 (citing the recent cases filed against banks by victims of ATM crimes).
See generally Strok, supra note 10, at 484 (stating that as a result of crimes occurring at ATMs,
"the potential for bank liability associated with ATM crime surfaces"); Miles, supra note 7, at 17172 (stating that with the development of electronic banking, a new wave of criminal activity has
developed).
13. Laura DiCola Kulwicki, A Landowner's Duty to Guard Against Criminal Attack:
Foreseeabilityand the PriorSimilar Incidents Rule, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 249 (1987); Michael J.
Yelnosky, Comment, Business Inviters' Duty to ProtectInvitees from CriminalActs, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 883, 883, 888-90 (1986); Michael J. Bayzler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection:
Landowners' Liability for Failureto ProtectPatronsfrom CriminalAttack, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 727,
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relationship" created an exception to the traditional rule. 4 In situations where
a special relationship exists, a greater duty of care is required. 5 The
relationship between a bank and an ATM customer is that of business invitorinvitee and qualifies as a special relationship requiring a duty to protect invitees
against foreseeable crime.
However, whether or not this duty includes

735 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 314, cmt. c. (1986) [hereinafterRESTATEMENT];
e.g., Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 381, 383-84 (Mich. 1988) (stating
that the landowner is not an insurer of the safety of invitees); Santiago v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 475 N.Y.S.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (finding that the owner of a housing complex did
not have a duty to protect a tenant from a third party attack); Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank, 424 So.
2d 594, 594 (Ala. 1982) (finding that a bank owed no duty to protect a bank customer injured during
an armed robbery).
14. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1387-88 (Ala. 1992) (stating that the
existence of a special relationship or special circumstances is an exception to the traditional rule that
a person has no duty to protect another from the criminal acts of a third person); Figueroa v.
Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427, 1430-31 (7th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that where a
"special relationship" exists, there is an exceptionto the rule that landowners have no duty to protect
others from the crimes of third parties); Balard v. Bassman Event Sec., Inc., 258 Cal. Rptr. 343,
344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "[g]enerally a person does not have a duty to control
another's conduct or to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct" but that an exception
arises where a special relationship exists); Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 461 N.E.2d 616 (IIL
App. Ct. 1984) (finding that in situations involving "special relationships" the business invitor is
under a duty to exercise a "high degree of care" toward invitees to protect them from foreseeable
injuries); Treadway v. Ebert Motor Co., 436 A.2d 994, 998 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (stating that the
liability of a landowner depends upon the status of the entrant at the time of the accident) (citing
Crotty v. Reading Industries, Inc., 345 A.2d 259, 262-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)); RESTATEMENT,
supra note 13, § 315(b) (stating that "[tihere is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person
as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless... a special relation exists between
the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection"); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.,
THE TORTS PRoCESS 486 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that "where courts have found a special relationship,
they have not hesitated to impose [a] liability" to protect another); D. Mark Collins, The Business
Inviter's [sic] Duty to Protect Invitees from Third-Party Criminal Attacks on the Premises: An
Overview and the Law in South Dakota After Small v. McKennan Hospital, 33 S. DAK. L. REV. 90,
94 (1988) (discussing that several jurisdictions have departed from the no-duty rule and found that
a business invitor has a duty to protect his patrons from criminal attack).
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, §§ 314A, 315. Special relationships in which a premises
owner has a greater duty include: common carrier/passenger, innkeeper/guest, landlord/tenant,
business invitor/business invitee. Id. § 314A. Section 315 states that the existence of a special
relationship may give rise to the right to be protected. Id. § 315. See, e.g., Nappier v. Kincade,
666 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. App. Ct. 1984) (stating tjat a duty may arise in a special relationship
or in special circumstances); Figueroa v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 879 F.2d 1427, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1989) (recognizing that the business invitor-invitee relationship is an exception to the general
no-duty rule). See generally Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 883-84; Kulwicki, supra note 13, at 24750.
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 and cmt. f; see infra notes 156-57. The bank's action
of giving bank customers ATM cards which provide 24-hour access to their accounts constitutes an
invitation to the customer to enter the bank premises and expect certain protection while using the
ATM. See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 419 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER] (recognizing a bank as a typical example of a relationship which places
a duty upon the premises owner to protect invitees); Strok, supra note 10, at 484-85. A number of
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protecting ATM customers against third party crimes depends upon the
foreseeability of the event. 7
Courts deciding ATM cases have been reluctant to hold banks liable for
third party crimes. I" This reluctance stems from the courts' narrow analysis
of the foreseeability which leads to duty. Due to the lack of case law regarding
ATM crimes,19 to determine a bank's duty courts have looked to other
decisions addressing a business invitor's duty to protect invitees. 20 In other
business invitor cases, the courts have primarily used four approaches. Two of

jurisdictions have relied on comment f to impose a duty on business invitors. Morgan v. Bucks
Assoc., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977); O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc., 255 N.E.2d 205 (111.
App. Ct. 1970); Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen'l Corp., 369 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976); Kenny v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978).
17. Foreseeability is the key factor used to define the limits of an individual's duty. Kuiwicki,
supra note 13, at 249. See also infra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
Throughout this note, notice and foreseeability will be used interchangeably to refer to a
business invitor's knowledge of the potential for future harm to the invitee. This reference is based
on the Restatement of Torts which places a duty upon the business invitor when the invitor knows
or has reason to know of the potential for harm or injury to the invitee. RESTATEMENT, supra note
13, § 344 cmt. f; see infra note 157.
18. Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 746 n.255 (1986). See
Williams v. First Alabama Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1989) (dismissing the ATM victim's
complaint because of the courts reluctance to impose the duty to protect); Page v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the Restatement
of Torts § 344 mistakenly places a duty on business owners to protect invitees from the criminal acts
of third parties); Dyer v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 588 N.Y.S.2d 499-500, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), cert.
denied, 610 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a bank did not have a duty to protect a ATM
customer against an armed robbery); Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150, 1152-53 (Inl.
App. Ct. 1992) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint despite the court's recognition that the existence
of a special relationship creates a duty to protect); Fuga v. Comerica Bank of Detroit, 509 N.W.2d
778, 779 (Mich. 1993) (holding that requiring a bank to protect ATM users from the criminal acts
of third parties would be too great a burden for banks to bear); Faulkner v. Sun Bank of S. Florida,
532 So. 2d 1293, 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming a summary judgment for the defendant
bank of an ATM crime victim's negligence claim against the bank); cf. McClendon v. Citizens &
S. Nat'l Bank, 272 S.E.2d 592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that a bank was not responsible
for the attack of a bank customer in the parking lot of the bank); Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of
Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982) (refusing to place a 'special duty' on a bank for
injuries caused to a bank customer during a bank robbery); Nigido v. First Nat'l Bank of Baltimore,
288 A.2d 127, 128 (Md. 1972) (finding that the bank did not have a special duty to protect a bank
customer from injuries sustained during a bank robbery). But see Gillen v. Delaware Trust Co.,
1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 332 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 1993) (denying the defendant-bank's motion
for summary judgment in a ATM crime case). See also infra Section IV (discussing the courts'
treatment of ATM cases).
19. See Miles, supra note 7, at 172 n.7 (stating that reported cases on ATM crimes are scarce).
20. See discussion infra section Il. See also David E. Teitelbaum, Violent Crime at ATMs,
49 Bus. LAw. 1363, 1363 (1994) (discussing the fact that a court hearing an ATM case relied on
the no-duty analysis used by another court hearing a business invitor-invitee case (citing to Page v.
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Compropst v.
Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975)).
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these, the no-duty approach and the special circumstances approach, view
foreseeability and duty narrowly. 2' The other two approaches, the totality of
the circumstances approach and the prior related incidents approach, use a
broader view of foreseeability and duty.' Despite the general trend toward the
broader approaches,' courts determining a bank's duty to protect ATM patrons
have followed the narrower approaches.'
As a result, courts have found as
a matter of law that the ATM crime was not foreseeable and relieved the bank
of liability.' This Note argues that courts should employ a broader approach
to assess a bank's liability.
First, the court should broaden the current analysis of foreseeability by
recognizing that prior related incidents may establish foreseeability. Presently,
courts deciding ATM cases have found ATM crimes to be unforeseeable, despite
evidence of prior criminal incidents related to the bank's premises.' However,
courts should recognize that past experiences may make future crime
foreseeable; therefore, evidence of prior criminal incidents related to the bank's
premises may establish foreseeability.27 However, whether the evidence is
sufficient to establish foreseeability should be a question for the jury rather than
the court, since such a determination involves questions of fact.'
Therefore, the court should broaden the current analysis of ATM cases
further and allow the jury to determine foreseeability. For example, when
evidence of prior related incidents is presented, the jury should determine
whether there were a sufficient number of prior incidents, whether the prior
incidents were sufficiently similar, or whether the prior incidents were close

21. See inftra Sections I.A. and ll.B.1.
22. See infra Sections 11.B.2. and Lll.B.3.
23. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89 (Ala. 1992) (stating that there is a
"growing national trend in the law toward expanding the recognized" special relationships "that give
rise to the exception to the general rle of no liability"); Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 883, 891
(reporting that the trend among courts is to recognize a duty to protect); Butler v. Acme Markets,
Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1144 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing that there is a gradual change in the law in
favor of a broadening application of the obligation to exercise reasonable care to protect others from
foreseeable harm). See Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
The court in Cohen stated that "[aippellate decisions of federal and other state courts are virtually
unanimous in holding possessors of business premises owe a duty of care to customers to take
affirmative steps to control a third party's foreseeable wrongful conduct." Id. (citing numerous
cases adhering to this view).
24. The courts confronted with ATM crime eases have applied either the no-duty approach or
a special circumstances approach to their analysis of a bank's duty to protect ATM patrons from
third party harm. See infra section IV.
25. See infra section IV.
26. See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
27. See infra section V.A.
28. See infra section V.B.
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enough in proximity to the bank to make the ATM crime foreseeable. Thus,
when evidence of prior related incidents exists, the jury should determine
whether the ATM crime was foreseeable. This should occur before the judge
determines the bank's duty.
Finally, broadening the current approach used to determine a bank's
liability should also include a flexible analysis of whether the bank breached its
duty and was therefore negligent. ' Recognizing that evidence of prior related
incidents may establish foreseeability will result in more findings that a bank has
a duty to protect ATM patrons.'iHowever, a finding of duty will not
automatically make a bank liable, since liability depends upon the jury's
determination of negligence.3 To determine negligence, the jury should apply
a flexible balancing test which weighs the burdens of imposing a duty on the
bank plus the social utility of the ATM against the gravity of the ATM crime
and the likelihood of its occurrence.32 As a result, banks will only be liable
for a breach of the imposed duty which occurs when the burden and utility
weigh less than the gravity and likelihood of the harm.33 With this flexible
balancing test, the jury can assess the bank's conduct and competing interests
before a bank will be found negligent. This broader, more flexible approach to
analyzing ATM crimes would prevent banks from being relieved of their duty
to ATM patrons when future crime is foreseeable. Yet, under this approach,
liability would not be imposed when the ATM crime was not foreseeable or
when the bank did not breach its duty.

29. See infra section VI.B (discussing the proposed analysis of negligence).
A cause of action for negligence requires four factors in order for liability to be imposed.
PROSSER, supra note 16, at 164. The basic elements may be stated as follows: (1) a duty or
obligation; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard of care, often stated as a breach of duty;
(3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) an actual damage or
injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 164-65. Traditionally, the first factor is said to be a question of law
which the judge determines. Id. at 235-37. The remaining factors are said to be questions of fact
which are determined by the jury. Id. See also infra section IV.B. (discussing the finctions of the
judge and jury).
Although all factors must be established before the defendant is found liable for negligence,
this note will deal only with duty and breach. The proposed model approach broadens the current
approach to ATM crime cases only at the stages of duty and breach in the traditional negligence
analysis. Thus, only those two factors of negligence will be discussed in this note. After duty and
breach are found, both causation and damages must be found before liability is imposed. However,
for purposes of this note, liability will be referred to as arising after the breach is established, and
it will assume that causation and damages have also been established.
30. See infra notes 127, 216, 231-47 and accompanying text.
31. See infra section VI.
32. See infra section VI.B.
33. See infra section VI.
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Section II of this Note will present a brief background of the growth of
ATMs and ATM crimes.' Section III will discuss the narrower and broader
approaches currently used by courts to assess the duty of a business invitor to
an invitee.35 Section IV will demonstrate how the courts hearing ATM cases
have adopted the narrower approaches to assess a bank's duty, and ultimate
liability for ATM crimes.' This Note argues in Section V that the narrower
approaches contradict both basic tort principles and public policy. This Note
further asserts that prior related incidents should be evaluated by the jury to
establish foreseeability before the judge determines the bank's general duty.3"
Finally, Section VI provides a model of court reasoning demonstrating a
broader, flexible analysis of a bank's liability.'
This model separates the
functions of the judge and the jury in the analysis of the foreseeability which
leads to the potential duty.39 If a duty is found, the jury should determine a
bank's liability using a flexible balancing test to evaluate each of the unique
circumstances involved in the ATM crime.'
II.

GROWrH OF ATMs AND ATM CRIMES

A. Development of ATMs
The automated teller machine has become Americans' most popular way to
get cash. 4' By simply inserting a card coded with a unique user identification
number, ATMs allow bank customers to access their accounts any time of
day. 42 Customers may withdraw and deposit money, transfer funds, or obtain
balance information on checking or savings accounts.43 The current rise in
ATM transaction volume demonstrates that customers are taking advantage of
this convenient banking method.' One network reported an increase in ATM
4
transactions from seventy-two million in 1991 to eighty million in 1992. 1
Another major network predicts that customers will transact 300 million

34. See infra notes 41-83 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 84-174 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 175-213 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 214-69 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 270-313 and accompanying text.
39. See infra section VI.A.
40. See infra section VI.B.
41. Marino, supra, note 8, at 3.
42. BAI, supra note 10, at 5.
43. Id. at 5-7.
44. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
45. William Gruber, Cash Station Spreads Wings Over Indiana, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1992,
Business §, at 5.
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transactions on their ATMs in 1994 alone, up from fifty-nine million
transactions conducted on their ATMs in 1989.'
Hoping to push these transaction numbers even higher, banks are
aggressively encouraging ATM use by increasing the accessibility of ATMs 7
as well as expanding the options and services offered.' Banks have expanded
the off-site locations,49 and customers may now find ATMs everywhere, from
shopping malls and grocery stores to convenience stores and gas stations.' °

46. Irvin Molotsky, Credit Cards, ATMs Gaining Wide Acceptance Abroad As Consumers
Weigh the Convenience Against the Risks, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1994, Travel §, at 24 (reporting
figures for the Mastercard/Cirrus network and the Visa/Plus network). See also Peter Mantius, An
Eye to the Cash Dispensers, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 1985, at 23 (reporting that Money Shop, a
Chicago based network, averaged 200,000 transactions per month in 1985 or 1538 transactions per
machine).
47. Gruber, supra note 45, at 5. Cash Station is extending their ATM network from Chicago
and Northwest Indians to Michigan, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Minnesota. Id. After an agreement
between the Cash Station ATM network and Amoco which enabled Cash Station customers to use
their ATM cards at Amoco gas stations, transactions rose from zero to 130,000 transactions at the
Amoco stations in Indiana and Illinois. Id.
Banks are eager to generate high volume use of ATMs. Julie A. Monahan, Safety Issues
Shaping Future AlMs, AM. BANKER, Dec. 5, 1989, at 6 (relating the concerns of payment services
specialist Linda Fenner Zimner that banks are over eager in their push to increase volume).
48. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
49. Off-site location refers to those ATMs located some place other than a bank branch or bank
premises such as in a shopping mall. However, the majority of ATM crimes occur at ATMs located
at banks. Jeffrey Kutler, Survey Shows Violent Crime at ATMs is Rare and Controllable, AM.
BANKER, June 29, 1987, at 15 (reporting that in 1987, 98% of the ATM crimes occurred on bank
premises). Kutler also reported that of these ATM crimes 75% occurred at ATMs located on the
exterior of the bank, 15% at ATMs enclosed in vestibles, and 9% at indoor ATMs. Id.
This note addresses ATMs located on property which a bank owns or has the ability to
control. For leased sites, a bank may have the ability to control the security surrounding the ATM
in which case they may have a duty to protect ATM patrons at that site. However, if the bank
leases the property on which the ATM is located, a bank may be relieved of liability due to the
lessor-lessee relationship. However, the extent of a bank's liability for crimes on leased property
is beyond the scope of this note. For further discussion of the liability of a lessor for crimes on the
leased premises, see Morgan v. Bucks Assoc., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In Morgan, the
Pennsylvania Court stated that,
where the owner of real estate leases parts thereof to several tenants, but retains
possession and control of the common areas which are to be used by business invitees
of the various tenants, the obligation of keeping the common areas safe for such
business invitees is imposed upon the landlord and not upon the tenants, in the absence
of a contrary provision in the leases.
Id. at 549 (citing Leary v. Lawrence Sales Corp., 275 A.2d 32 (Pa. 1971)).
50. Interview with Robert R. Gierman, Director of ATM Department at NBD Bank N.A., in
Crown Point, IN (Sept. 6, 1994) [hereinafter Gierman Interview] (reporting that NBD had an ATM
in a shopping mall which conducted an average of 13,000 transactions a month). Mantius, supra
note 46, at 23 (reporting that Switched Transaction Services Inc. had ATMs in supermarkets and
convenience stores in addition to their branch offices). John Randazzo, County Mandates Safety
Measuresfor Cash Machines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, § 13WC, at 17. (reporting that banks
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Not only have banks increased customers' access to ATMs within the United
States, but abroad as well." Further, banks have encouraged customers to
increase their use of ATMs by distributing as many cards as possible, and then
by persuading cardholders to use them.52 In addition, banks are equipping
ATMs with a host of new features, including distribution of postage stamps,
movie tickets, and travelers checks, in hope of generating more business. 3

have installed ATMs in airport terminals). Michael Weinstein, Are Off-Site AThs Worth the Effort?,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1986, at 1 (reporting that banks were locating ATMs in supermarkets,
convenience stores, and gas stations and were planning to increase the number and locations of offsite ATMs).
51. See Molotsky, supra note 46. The Mastercard/Cirrus network reported having 177,518
machines in use with 64 of these outside the United States in 1994. 1d. The Visa/Plus network
reported having 186,000 ATMS with 16 outside the United States. Id. American Express reports
80,000 ATMs with eight outside the United States. Id.
52. Roland E. Koch, Consumer Banking: Automated Teller Machines- What Can Banks Do to
Help Consumers Overcome Their Reluctance to UseA
AiMsfor Making Deposits?, AM. BANKER, Jan.
18, 1994, at 8A (reporting that banks encourage customers to use ATMs by giving demonstrations
of the functions of the machine to both current and new customers); Janice Fioravante, As the ATM
Age Matures, Old Assumptions May Die, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1986, at 17 (reporting that banks
are focusing on promotional efforts and trying to increase the number of cardholders); David
LaGesse, Wooing Customers to ATMs: Beyond Puppy Love, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1985, at 1
(reporting that to encourage ATM use, some banks provide an ATM card on the initial visit and
have the customermake their first transaction on the ATM); Michael Weinstein, CustomerLines Not
Getting LongeratATMs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Weinstein, CustomerLines];
Michael Weinstein, Levying Fees for Use of AlMs Spreads to Floridafrom Texas, AM BANKER,
Feb. 14, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Weinstein, Levying Fees] (reporting that banks are working hard
to persuade people to increase their ATM use).
To encourage customers to increase their use of ATMs, some banks offer rebates to customers
if they make at least one ATM transaction monthly. Christina MacKenzie, Increase in Crime at
Teller Machines PromptsIntroductionof Bill to Tighten Security Rules, AM. BANKER, July 28, 1986,
at 3 (reporting that the Bank of America offered customers overdraft protection and a benefit plan
for customers who increase their use of ATM services). Banks have also taken measures to ensure
that customers are comfortable using ATMs. For example, due to customer's reluctance to make
deposits through the ATM, one bank invested in an ATM which shows a facsimile of the deposited
check on the screen in order to make customers feel more at ease about depositing money into the
machine. Koch, supra, at 8A (reporting that only 10% of the total transactions were deposits).
53. Matt Barthel, Bank Appetite for ATM Fees Maybe Risky, AM. BANKER, May 15, 1991, at
1 (noting that typically these additional features are placed on ATMs which have low volumes of
transactions in hope of increasing the traffic at these ATMs rather than at ATMs which have a high
volume of transactions). Lawrence M. Fisher, A. TM. 's to Dispense American Express Travelers
Checks, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1994, at D6. Customers can also purchase mutual funds and stock
at ATMs. Glenn Burkins, Mutual Funds Coming Soon to an ATM Near You, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23,
1993, at C3 (reporting that customers can "buy or sell shares, check their balances or transfer
money from one fund to another" through the ATM); American Press, Citibank Offers Stock
Services at A. T.M.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at D3. Banks have even extended ATM services
to allow customers to make donations to their favorite charity from ATMs. Doron P. Levin, Giving
to Charity Using Teller Machines, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 12, 1994, § 1, at 39.
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The aggressive efforts to increase ATM accessibility and customer use are
driven by the revenue that banks derive from these efforts. The economic
benefit generated by the ATM varies with location and services.' Off-site
ATMs, though generally more costly to maintain than ATMs at bank branch
locations, generate a much higher volume of transactions." Yet, banks have
turned the expense of the off-site ATMs and additional features into profits by
charging fees for transactions by non-bank users and for the use of the unique
However, the result of banks' efforts to increase use is that as
features.'
customers increase their ATM use, they also increase their chances of becoming
a victim of a criminal attack at the ATM.
B. ATM Crime
With banks actively encouraging ATM use and ATM use increasing,57 the
potential for an ATM customer to become a victim of a criminal act by a third

54. Gierman Interview, supra note 50.
55. Id. Mr. Gierman stated that off-site ATMs require the bank to bear costs not required of
branch site ATMs. Id. For example, an ATM in a shopping mall requires the bank to hire someone
to service and maintain the ATM at the off-site location. Id. The bank is also required to pay
dataline costs of connecting the off-site location with the bank's on-site datalines. Id.; Cf.
Weinstein, Levying Fees, supra note 52, at 1 (stating that electronic banking is cheaper for banks
than other paper service banking); see also infra notes 301-03 and accompanying text.
56. According to a study by the Consumer Federation of America, banks reported savings of
more than 2 billion dollars annually in teller costs from ATM use and profiting nearly 2 billion.
Andrew Leckey, Who Saves With ATMs?, CHI. TIB., June 16, 1994, at C9. Cf. Gierman
Interview, supra note 50. Mr. Gierman stated that off-site ATMs were more profitable than on-site
ATMs since a greater number of foreign transactions, transactions by non-NBD customers for which
a service fee is charged, are conducted at off-site locations. Id. However, the increase in
transactions must be substantial in order to off-set the dataline costs and servicing costs required for
an off-site ATM. Id. See also Weinsten, supra note 50, at I (stating that banks earn profits from
off-site ATMs by charging transaction fees to foreign customers).
In order to increase transactions, banks have aggressively pushed to increase customers' use
and accessibility to ATMs. Barthel, supra note 53, at 1. By generating high transaction volumes
at off-site ATMs and by increasing use of the attractive optional features, such as stamp dispensing,
a bank increases its fee income. Id. Banks are also exploring new money making methods such as
renting ATMs as billboards for advertising. Weinstein, supra note 50, at 1 (stating that banks
started advertising on ATM screens in hopes of increasing profits); Mantius, supra note 46, at 23.
The average reported fee charged for non-bank customers is one dollar. Leckey, supra, at C9
(reporting that customers should expect fees to continue to rise). However, some banks charge fees
as high as $2.75 a transaction. Robert Heady, The Price of Convenience, CHI. TIB., Aug. 16,
1994, at Cll. For the service of buying or selling shares in a money-market mutual fund, banks
charge a one dollar service fee. Burkins, supra note 53, at C3. In addition, some banks are
charging fees for "dormant" ATM cards in order to get customers to use them more. See Leckey,
supra, at C9. California now has a statute which requires banks to disclose any surcharge upon the
usage of the ATM to the customer prior to the completion of the transaction. CAL. FIN. CODE §
13080 (West Supp. 1994); see infra note 71.
57. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. See also Barthel, supranote 53, at 1 (stating
that the average customer currently visits an ATM once a week).
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party also increases.'
The ATM's unique features, such as the convenient
twenty-four hour access, and the ease of withdrawing and depositing cash when
no bank personnel are present, are attractions that draw consumers to ATMs.
Unfortunately, these attractive features draw criminals." Furthermore, ATM
customers are often transferring and exchanging money in a parking lot, making
the customer particularly vulnerable to a criminal attack.'
The public recognition of criminal acts occurring at ATMs, combined with
the increase in ATM use, has made the safety of customers a widespread
concern. 6 The crimes are primarily robberies,62 but vary in degree, ranging

58. The possibility of being a victim of a third party crime is a very real threat for most
Americans. With the United States having higher crime rates than other Western industrial societies,
criminal violence is a legitimate concern for our nation. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 885-86 (citing
to W. SKOGAN & M. MAXFIELD, COPING WITH CRIME 28 (1981)). ATMs are a prime target
because areas of commercial activity in particular have been a target for criminal activity. Id. at
886-87.
59. See generally Marino, supra note 8, at 3; Lipman, supra note 8, at 24 (quoting the Bureau
of Justice Statistics that "electronic banking [provides an] environment that is potentially fertile for
criminal abuse").
The criminally attractive nature of the 24-hour accessible ATM situation is comparable to the
nature of a 24-hour convenience store which was recognized as an attractive target for crime in
Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). In Cohen, the court
stated that the mere operation of the defendant's all-night convenience store created "'an especial
temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct' thus increasing the foreseeability of injury
resulting from third party misconduct in the early morning hours." Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 174 (4th ed. 1971)). The court stated that common experience
and reason confirms that more crimes occur at night because fewer people are around to interfere
and the criminal's getaway is easier. Id. Thus, any business which is open 24-hours is a target for
nighttime criminal activity. Id.
60. By transacting business in an empty bank parking lot, the ATM customer becomes a prime
target for criminals. See Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 886-87, 904. Parking lots create "unique
opportunities for crime." Id. at 886-87. The lots are usually remote and poorly lit and "present
little danger of discovery." Id. Security experts recognize that parking lots pose substantial risks
for business customers who are in possession of money or purchased goods, and that these areas
cannot be considered secure, particularly after dark. Id. at 887 n. 17 (quoting D. HUGHES & P.
BoWLER, THE SEcuRrrY SURvEY 118 (1982)); Cohen v. Southland, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 578 (stating
that parking lots create a temptation and opportunity for crime (citing Gomez v. Ticor, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 600 (Cal Ct. App. 1983)); accord Isacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 660
(Cal. 1985). See also Stalzer v. European Am. Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982)
(stating that it is the very nature of the business conducted at a bank which makes a bank a target
for robbery and a risk to the public at large).
61. See Bruce C. Smith, High-Profile Cases Heighten Public Concern About Robberies at
A7Ms, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 22, 1994, at 1 (stating that newspaper and television reports of
ATM crime have "heightened a rising tide of public fear about the safety of using ATMs").
62. In 1987, it was reported that the most common crimes at ATMS were robberies that
occurred after cash had been withdrawn. BAI, supra note 10, at 38 (stating that the types of ATM
crimes include simple assaults, assaults with weapons, sexual assault, and abductions). In two-thirds
of the crimes, the customers were accosted by a single perpetrator using a handgun, knife, or blunt
weapon. Jeffrey Kutler, A7M Crimes Don't Fit the Stereotype; Survey FindsRobberies of
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from robberies resulting in murders,' to armed robbery where the victims are
assaulted and threatened.'
Though the frequency of ATM crimes has
decreased slightly in recent years,' the continued occurrence and public
recognition of criminal activity' illustrates that the problem remains an
important concern. 67

Customers Are Rare Occurrences, AM. BANKER, May 5, 1987, at 2.
63. One such example is that of a 22-year-old woman who was shot in the head during the
robbery of a Chicago ATM. Martinez, supra note 8, at 6. The woman and her fiance were using
a Citibank ATM when they were robbed at gunpoint by a third party. Id. The third party shot the
woman when she tried to escape. Id. The murderer was caught the following week and charged
with first-degree murder and armed robbery. Id. See also Smith, supra note 61, at 1 (relating the
murder of a Detroit woman shot and killed by a 14-year-old for $80 she had just withdrawn from
an ATM).
64. See, e.g., Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1991) (involving a woman who was held up and struck in the face by a group of young males after
withdrawing money from an ATM); Dyer v. Norstar Bank, N.A. 588 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1993) (involving a man who was robbed of $200 at
gunpoint by an assailant while the man was using an ATM); Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So.
2d 26 (Ala. 1989) (involving a woman who, while sitting in her car at a drive-up ATM, was held
up at gunpoint and robbed of the money she had just withdrawn); Smith, supra note 61, at 1
(relating the case of an Indianapolis man who was robbed and held captive for four hours by gunmen
who approached him while he was withdrawing cash from an ATM late at night).
65. See Perez-Pena, supra note 8, at Al (stating that in New York City there were 378 ATM
robberies in 1990, 380 in 1991, 278 in 1992, 304 in 1993, and 110 in the first half of 1994).
Despite the decreases emphasized by the banking associations, ATM crimes are remarkably
prevalent. Recent crime statistics showed that more than 200 holdups or attempted crimes have
occurred each year at ATMs since 1992. Randazzo, supra note 50, at 17. The Chicago police
reported that there were 47 ATM crimes from June 1992 to June 1993, which was a decrease of
17 % from the previous year. Telephone Interview with Sonia Barbara, Public Relations Director,
American Bankers Association, Washington D.C. (Sept. 7, 1994). The Los Angeles Police
Department reported 152 incidents of ATM crime in 1992. Id. The New York City Police
Department reported 743 robberies at ATMs between January 1990 and December 1991, accounting
for less than one-half of one percent of crime in the city. Id. Also, the California Bankers
Association found that, in 1992, there were 499 ATM crimes reported out of 599 million ATM
transactions in the state. Id.
66. One recent crime brought to the public's attention was the third party attack on an elderly
man who was knifed several times while withdrawing money from a New York ATM at 6:30 in the
morning. See Perez-Pena, supra note 8, at AI. In this crime, bystanders saw the commotion and
responded to the elderly man's call for help. Id. The bystanders trapped the assailant in the ATM
lobby until police arrived. Id. This case also raises the question of whether a bank would be liable
for injury to third persons who try to prevent an ATM crime. Whether or not a bank's liability
extends this far is beyond the scope of this note, but the concept of such liability is worth noting and
may be a consideration when determining the limits of a bank's duty to protect patrons.
67. ATM Safety Act, N.Y. Assembly Bill 11808, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Seas. § 37 (1994)
(legislative intent) (stating that the New York Legislature found that eliminating the risk was of
"utmost importance"); Sullivan, supra note 8, at 4 (stating that a recent wave of ATM crimes
"punctuates the urgency of proposed state legislation" to require banks to improve security at
ATMs). See generallyRobert Davis, Burke Backs ATMs for Police Stations, CHI. TRIB., July 22,
1993, Chicagoland §, at 2 (reporting that because elderly people perceive that they are not safe
withdrawing money from ATMs, Chicago officials suggested that ATMs be placed in fire stations
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The concern regarding risk of robbery and other crimes at ATMs has
prompted several legislative attempts to regulate ATM security.'
For
example, Congress enacted the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) to deal
with unauthorized transfers and fraud problems related to electronic money
transfer services such as ATMs.' While the EFTA does address the basic

and police stations); See Randazzo, supra note 50, at 17. Randazzo quotes a state official to say
that ATMs are "a fact of daily life. Residents, visitors, commuters - anyone who uses them - are
challenged by the risk of robbery and other criminal activities. Nighttime hours, from sunset to
sunrise, are particularly dangerous when you are alone." Id. (quoting Andrew A. Albanese, head
of the Public Safety and Criminal Justice Committee and Board Majority leader for Eastchester
County, New York, who sponsored the law in Eastchester which required additional safeguards at

ATMs).
In addition, customers have expressed their fears and concerns. Clarence Johnson, S.F.
Voters to Decide on A7M Loitering: Supervisors Reject Proposalfor Invisible Security Bubble, S.
F. CHRON., Mar. 22, 1994, at Al. See also Thomas Huang, supra note 8, at C7 (quoting a bank
customer as saying that he "will not go to an ATM at night anymore" due to the reports of criminal
attacks); John T. McQuiston, Nassau County Board Approves Tough Security Law for A. TM. 's,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1994, at B2 (reporting that a lawyer for the New York State Banker's
Association stated that the banking industry is aware of customers' fear of ATM crime). The
American Banker's Association has recognized that ATM crime is a serious problem, though it
maintains that the public should not panic. Matt Barthel, ABA: Banks Can Benefit from Safety
Measures atAThs, AM. BANKER, Aug. 11, 1994, at 10.
68. See McQuiston, supra note 67, at B2 (reporting that New York City's regulations were
enacted after several well-publicized ATM robberies, including the holdup of a councilwoman);
James C. McKinley, Jr., Tough Cash-MachineBill Is Approved, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1992, at B3
(reporting that a New York City bill was pending for a year before it gained momentum due to a
discovery by council members that a "pervasive fear about crime at the machines" existed);
Randazzo, supra note 50, at 17 (reporting that New York's Westchester County Board of Legislators
ordered banks to install safeguards because bank customers face the risk of robbery and other crime
every time they use an ATM).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982). The Electronic FundsTransfer Act (EFTA) establishes the basic
rights of both the consumers who use electronic money transfer services and of the institutions that
offer the service. Id. § 1693(b). The EFTA states:
(a) The Congress finds that the use of electronic systems to transfer funds provides the
potential for substantial benefits to consumers.
However, due to the unique
characteristics of such systems, the application of existing consumer protection
legislation is unclear, leaving the rights and liabilities of consumers, financial
institutions, and intermediaries in electronic fund transfers undefined.
(b) It is the purpose of this subchapter to provide a basic framework establishing the
rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems
Id.
The Federal Reserve Board subsequently enacted Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1995),
which implements the EFTA and protects consumers who use EFT systems by imposing certain
duties and liabilities on financial institutions. Id. § 205.1(b).
The EFTA defines electronic fund transfers as "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction
originated by check, draft, or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic
terminal, telephonic instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize
a financial institution to debit or credit an account." 12 C.F.R. § 205. 2(g) (1995). For additional
information regarding various electronic banking services, see Horan, Outlookfor EFT Technology
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rights and liabilities of a bank for fraudulent transfers, it does not address a
bank's liability for crimes by third parties.' Successful regulations have also
Washington,74
Oregon,'
been enacted in California, 7' Georgia,'
in COMPUTER AND BANKING: ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND PUBUC POLICY 21 (K.
Colton and K. Kraemer eds., 1980).
The EFTA sets limits on consumers' recovery for unauthorized transfers from their accounts,
including transfers which are initiated by a person other than the consumer and without actual
authority to initiate such transfer, transfers from which the consumer receives no benefit, and
transfers which the consumer did not voluntarily give out any means of access to their bank account.
15 U.S.C. § 1693a(11) (1982). An amendment to Regulation E adds two examples of unauthorized
transfers: where there has been a fraudulent transfer by an employee of a financial institution and
where a withdrawal is conducted by using an access device stolen or fraudulently obtained from the
consumer. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2 (1) (1995).
The limits set forth by the Act require that for a bank to avoid liability, the bank must provide
the consumer with a means for identification, such as a personal identification code, and with written
information disclosing potential consumer liability, the procedure to be followed in the event that
an access card is lost or stolen, and the bank's business hours. Id. If the bank fails to meet these
requirements, the consumer will not incur any liability. Id. § 205.6(a). If the bank meets these
requirements, a consumer who reports an unauthorized electronic transfer within two days after
learning of the theft incurs a liability of $50 or the amount of the unauthorized withdrawal,
whichever is the lesser amount. Id. § 205.6(b)(1). If the consumer does not report the loss within
two days after discovering the loss, the consumer's liability may rise to a maximum of $500. Id.
§ 205.6(b)(1). If the consumer fails to report the loss within 60 days of an unauthorized transfer
appearing on his or her bank statement, the consumer will be subject to unlimited liability. Id. §
205.6 (b)(2). The consumer's liability may include the amount of the unauthorized transfer plus the
amount of any subsequent unauthorized transfers which the financial institution can establish would
not have occurred but for the consumer's failure to notify the institution. Id. The consumer may
also incur unlimited liability if the bank can establish that the transfer was authorized. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693g(a)-(b) (1982). In addition, the Act places the burden of going forward to show an
unauthorized transfer from his account on the consumer and places the burden of proof of any
consumer liability for the transfer upon the bank. Id.
Several cases have been litigated which invoke the EFTA. See, e.g., In re New York v.
Citibank, N.A., 537 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ognibene v. Citibank, N.A., 446 N.Y.S.2d
845 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); Feldman v. Citibank, 443 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1981); Judd v.
Citibank, 435 N.Y.S.2d 210 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980); see also Charles G. Daley, What's Your
Answer?, AM. BANKER, April 21, 1982, at 4 (describing how the EFTA Act would be applied to
an unauthorized withdrawal).
70. Miles, supra note 7, at 186. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1982).
The EFTA is primarily aimed at combatting fraud and unauthorized transfers. While fraud
is major source of criminal activity occurring at ATMs, and is a strong concern in the banking
industry, an in-depth examination of the problem is beyond the scope of this note. For further
discussion of the problems relating to ATM fraud, see Leckey, supra note 56, at 9; Michael
Weinstein, ATM User Safeguards Cridcized, AM. BANKER, April 10, 1985, at 1.
71. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 13000-070 (West Supp. 1994). The California statute requires a bank
to establish a procedure for evaluating the safety of each ATM which evaluates the lighting and
landscape surrounding the ATM as well as the crime rate of the surrounding neighborhood. Id. §
13030. The statute also requires that each ATM meet minimum lighting requirements. Id. § 13041.
The bank must also provide each ATM customer or household with notices of basic safety
precautions which customers should follow while using an ATM. Id. § 13050. The regulations do
not apply to ATMs located inside a building, unless the building is freestanding and provides an
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enclosure solely for the ATM or unless a transaction can be conducted from outside the building.
Id. § 13060(1)-(2). The regulations also exempt ATMs "located in any access area, building,
enclosed space, or parking area which is not controlled by the operator." Id. § 13060(3).
72. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-8-1 to 8-8 (Supp. 1994). The Georgia ATM regulations focus on
ATMs in remote locations, and requires banks to adopt procedures for evaluating the safety of all
remote service terminals. Id. § 7-8-2. These procedures must include consideration of the lighting
and the landscaping of the remote terminal, as well as consideration of the incidence of violence in
the neighborhood of the site as recorded by local law enforcement. Id. The Georgia statute also
requires banks to provide customers with notices of basic safety precautions to be employed while
using a remote service terminal. Id. § 7-8-4.
Under the Georgia statute, the operator of the ATM bears the burden of compliance with the
regulatory provisions, however, this burden can be shifted to an individual who leases space to an
ATM operator if that individual controls the access area or defined parking area. Id. § 7-8-3. Thus,
under Georgia law, liability for injuries occurring at off-site ATMs, such as those leased to a bank
by a mall or grocer, may fall on the lessor. Id. § 7-8-5(3) (stating that the provisions do not apply
to "any area, including any access area, building, enclosed space, or parking area, which is not
controlled by the operator"). The statute exempts from liability any person whose function is to
provide for exchange, transfer, or dissemination of electronic fund transfer data and is not otherwise
a financial depository institution or an operator. Id. § 7-8-7. In addition, the regulations do not
apply to any remote ATM which is inside a building, unless the building is designed for the "sole
purpose of providing an enclosure" for the remote ATM or except to the extent a transaction can
be conducted from outside the building. Id. § 7-8-5.
73. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 714.280-.315 (Supp. 1993). The legislative intent of the statute is to
"enhance the safety of consumers using ATMs." Id. § 714.280(1). The statute was not meant to
discourage the siting of ATMs or "to impose a duty to relocate or modify ATMs upon the
occurrence of any particular events or circumstances." Id. § 714.280(2). The legislation is also
aimed at providing a uniform, objective standard of safety applicable to all ATMs and night
depositories. Id.
The Oregon regulations mandate that banks establish procedures for evaluating the safety of
ATMs or night safety deposit facilities, as well as comply with minimum lighting requirements. Id.
§§ 714.285-.295. The regulations also require the bank to issue safety information to customers.
Id. § 714.300. The statute exempts from its application any ATMs located within a building, unless
the building's sole purpose is to provide an enclosure for ATM use or if a transaction can be
conducted from outside the building. Id. § 714.305. Also exempted are ATMs or night deposit
facilities that are located in areas not controlled by the operator. Id. § 714.305(3). Thus, a bank
would be relieved of liability for a violation of the statute when a lessor controls the lighting or
landscape surrounding the ATM. Id. § 714.200(6) (defining control of an access area as the "means
... to determine how, when and by whom the access area or defined parking area is to be used and
how it is to be maintained, lighted and landscaped").
74. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.174 (Supp. 1994). The Washington regulations apply to
both ATMs and night deposit facilities and were intended to "enhance the safety of consumers using
automated teller machines and night deposit facilities in Washington without discouraging the siting
of automated teller machines and night deposit facilities in locations convenient to consumers' homes
and workplaces." Id. §§ 19.174.010. Due to the inherent subjectivity of decisions concerning the
safety of ATMs, the legislature hoped to set forth an objective standard of safety for operators of
ATMs and night deposit facilities to implement. Id.
The regulations require banks to adopt procedures for evaluating the safety of the ATM or
night deposit facility, including evaluation of the lighting for the ATM, of the landscaping or
vegetation surrounding the ATM, the access area, and the parking area, and the incidence of crime
in the locale surrounding the ATM, according to the records of the local law enforcement agencies.
Id. § 19.174.030. The statute specifies the minimum lighting requirements needed at the ATM and
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in the surrounding area. Id. The statute requires banks to furnish each customer or household with
a notice informing the customer of basic safety precautions to be employed while using the ATM.
Id. § 19.174.060.
The regulations exempt from application ATMs located inside buildings unless the building
is a freestanding installation provided solely to enclose the ATM or ATMs inside a building from
which a transaction may still be conducted from outside the building. Id. § 19.174.070(l)-(2). Also
exempt are ATMs in a location which is not controlled by the bank such that the bank is not
responsible for maintenance, lighting, or landscaping the area. Id. § 19.174.020(6), 19.174.070(3).
Thus, banks which lease the ATM site or do maintain the surrounding area would be relieved of
liability for failure to comply with the statutory regulations.
75. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 1-207 (1994). See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 4 (describing
the reasoning behind the Maryland legislation). The Maryland law exempts from its application any
ATM located inside a building which is not designed solely to enclose the ATM or ATMs located
inside a building except those which are still accessible from the outside and those ATMs located
in areas not controlled by the operator. Id. § 1-207(b).
The law requires banks to adopt procedures for evaluating the safety of an ATM site before
the ATM is installed. Id. § 1-207(c). The state does not impose a duty to relocate or modify the
landscape of an ATM prior to the date of enactment of the statute. Id.
The statute sets forth the minimum lighting requirements for the ATM one-half hour before
sunrise and one-half hour after sunset. Id. § 1-207(e). The statute also requires that the bank
deliver a notice of basic safety precautions to each customer or household. Id. The precautions
must include notice to the customer to be aware of his surroundings, to consider using the ATM
accompanied by someone, to pocket the cash upon receipt and not to display the cash, to consider
leaving the ATM if the customer notices anything suspicious, to consider cancelling the transaction
upon noticing anything suspicious, and to report all crimes to the bank and to local law enforcement
officials. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 655.960-65 (West Supp. 1995). The Florida statute sets forth the basic
requirements for the lighting and landscape surrounding the ATM. Id. § 655.962. The bank must
also provide each customer receiving an access device with information regarding the exercise of
proper safety precautions while using the ATM. Id. § 655.963.
The statute exempts from its application any ATMs located inside a building, unless the
building is freestanding and designed to provide an enclosure for the ATM or if it is still possible
to conduct a transaction from outside the building. Id. § 655.964. Furthermore, the statute exempts
ATMs located in areas which not controlled by the operator. Id. The statute also exempts any
person whose function is to provide for "the exchange, transfer, or dissemination of electronic funds
transfer data and is not otherwise a financial institution." Id. § 655.964(2). Finally, the statute also
provides that a violation does not constitute negligence per se. Id. § 655.961.
77. ATM Safety Act, N.Y. Assembly Bill 11808, 215th N.Y. Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1994).
See McQuiston, supra note 67, at B2. The New York statute is the strictest of the current state
statutes and requires video cameras and entry doors equipped with locking devices as part of the
minimum safety standards required at each ATM. Id. § 37-B.
Unlike other statutes, the New York law provides a civil penalty for violation of one of the
provisions. Id. § 37-E. The provisions are enforceable by application to the attorney general and
an injunction against the defendant may be issued if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that
a violation does exist without requiring proof of injury. Id. Upon finding a violation has occurred,
a civil penalty of not more than five hundred dollars may be imposed. Id.
The New York City council has enacted even stricter regulations than the state regulations.
The Administrative Code of New York City requires banks to install either locking entry doors,
permitting entry only by an ATM card, or by requiring banks to post a security guard. N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE, tit. 10, § 10-160 (Supp. 1994).
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Nevada,' all dealing specifically with security measures aimed at preventing
third party criminal attacks. The majority of the regulations deal only with the

78. NJ. Assembly Bill 1828, N.J. 206th Legis., 1st Seas. (1994). The intent of the New
Jersey legislature in enacting the regulations is to establish a "standard of good faith" for the
evaluation of ATMs rather than to impose a duty to close, relocate, or modify ATMs upon the
occurrence of any specific events or circumstances. Id. § 2(b).
The New Jersey ATM regulations require banks to evaluate the safety of ATMs including the
lighting and landscape surrounding the ATM. Id. § 2(1)-(2). Every ATM is required to have a
video camera to record all persons entering the facility, id. § 3, and must meet the minimum
statutory lighting requirements. Id. § 4. The minimum lighting includes lighting sufficient "to
permit a sighted person entering the facility to readily and easily see all persons occupying the
facility, and to permit a sighted person inside the facility to readily and easily see all persons
entering the facility." Id. § 4(d). Under the New Jersey statute, banks must provide each customer
with a notice of basic safety precautions which warn customers to be alert to their surroundings, to
stop a transaction if circumstances cause them to be uneasy as to their safety, to close the door to
an ATM equipped with a door, to secure cash upon the person before leaving the ATM, and to
report complaints to the operator or to the Department of Banking. Id. § 5(b). The notice must also
include the telephone number of the operator and the Department of Banking. Id. The bank must
also post a sign clearly visible in the vicinity of the ATM containing the basic precautions. Id. §
5(c).
The statute does not apply to ATMs located inside a building, unless the building is
freestanding, existing for the sole purpose of providing an enclosure for the ATM. Id. § 8. In
addition, the statute states that a bank found to have violated any of the provisions shall have five
days to correct such violation. Id. § 6(b). If the violation is not corrected, a civil penalty of not
more than $250 shall be collected. Id.
79. ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-305 (1994). The Code regulations apply to Chicago ATMs.
The regulations set minimum lighting requirements for both the parking lot and the adjacent
building. Id. § 4-305-40(c). The banks or owners of the ATM are required to issue basic safety
precautions to all customers. Id. § 4-305-60. The regulations also provide that violations of the
provisions do not constitute negligence per se and that substantial compliance with the provisions
will serve as prima facie evidence that the bank provided adequate security. Id. § 4-305-20.
80. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 660.115-.235 (Supp. 1992). The Nevada statute requires the
operator of the ATM to adopt a procedure for evaluating the safety of an ATM location before the
ATM is installed, however, the statute does not impose a duty to relocate or modify ATMs installed
before the effective date of the statute, October 1, 1991. Id. § 660.195. The statute sets forth
minimum requirements for illumination one-half hour after sunset and one-half hour before sunrise.
Id. § 660.205. The statute further requires that the issuer of an access device for an ATM must
deliver a notice of basic safety precautions to each customer or household. Id. § 660.215. The
precautions must include notice to the customer to be aware of his surroundings, to consider using
the ATM accompanied by someone, to pocket the cash upon receipt and not to display the cash, to
consider leaving the ATM if the customer notices anything suspicious, to consider cancelling the
transaction upon noticing anything suspicious, and to report all crimes to the bank and local law
enforcement officials. Id.
The statutory provisions do not apply to ATMs located inside buildings or ATMs located in
areas which are not controlled by the operator, such that the operator does not have the authority
to maintain, light, or landscape the area of access or parking area. Id. §§ 660.225, 660.145. The
Nevada statute specifically states that "substantial compliance with these sections is conclusive
evidence that the operator of an automated teller has provided adequate measures for the safety of
his customers." Id. § 660.235C2). Thus, under Nevada law, compliance with the statutory
provisions may relieve an operator from liability for injury to an ATM customer.
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minimum lighting requirements surrounding ATMs, the height of landscaping
near ATMs, and the use of reflective mirrors around ATMs."' Further, the

81. The Washington statute is an example of the typical lighting requirements set forth by the
statutes.
The operator, owner, or other person responsible for an automated teller machine or
night deposit facility shall provide lighting during hours of darkness with respect to an
open and operating automated teller machine or night deposit facility and a defined
parking area, access area, and the exterior of an enclosed automated teller machine or
night deposit facility installation according to the following standards:
(1) There must be a minimum of ten candle-foot power at the face of the automated
teller machine or night deposit facility and extending in an unobstructed direction
outward five feet;
(2) There must be a minimum of two candle-foot power within fifty feet from all
unobstructed directions from the face of the automated teller machine or night deposit
facility. In the event the automated teller machine or night deposit facility is located
within ten feet of the comer of the building and the automated teller machine or night
deposit facility is generally accessible from the adjacent side, there must be a minimum
of two candle-foot power along the first forty unobstructed feet of the adjacent side of
the building; and
(3) There must be a minimum of two candle-foot power in that portion of the defined
parking area within fifty feet of the automated teller machine or night deposit facility.
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.174.050 (Supp. 1994). For other statutory provisions requiring similar
lighting provisions, see GA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-3 (Supp. 1994); CAL. FIN. CODE § 13041 (West
Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660.205 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.962 (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 1-207(d) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 714.295 (Supp.
1993); N.J. Assembly Bill 1828, 206th Legis., 1st Sess. § 4 (1994), ATM Safety Act, N.Y.
Assembly Bill 11808, 215th N.Y. Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. § 37-C (1994).
The majority of the statutes require banks to incorporate an assessment of the landscape
surrounding an ATM in a safety evaluation. For example, Florida requires that:
each operator, or other person ... for an automated teller machine, shall ensure that
the height of any landscaping, vegetation, or other physical obstructions in the area
required to be lighted . . . shall not exceed three feet, except that trees trimmed to a
height of ten feet and whose diameters are less than two feet and manmade physical
obstructions required by statute, law, code, ordinance, or other governmental regulation
shall not be affected by this subsection.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.961-.962 (West Supp. 1995). Additional provisions regulating landscaping
are found in Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.174.030; Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
660.195(b); California, CAL. FIN. CODE § 13030; Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 1207(c)(2)(ii); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 714.285; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 7-8-2; and NEW
JERSEY, N.J. Assembly Bill 1828 § 2(2).
Some of the states also require the use of reflective mirrors. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
655.962 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring reflective mirrors or surfaces at each ATM so as to provide
the ATM customer with a view behind him or her while the customer uses the ATM); N.Y.
Assembly Bill 11808 § 37-D (requiring a reflective mirror placed to permit a customer to
"completely view" all areas of the facility). New York and New Jersey both require that a video
camera be installed near the ATM. N.J. Assembly Bill 1828 § 3; N.Y. Assembly Bill 11808 § 37-

B(D).
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statutes only regulate newly installed ATMs and do not apply to existing
ATMs. 1

While these statutes take active steps toward making ATMs safer for
patrons, the regulations fail to provide the courts with clear guidance in
assessing the liability of banks for third party crimes. These acts set forth safety
requirements but, with the exception of New York, do not clearly state how
their violation affects bank liability for third party acts, or to what extent these
factors should be included in considering a bank's duty of care. 3 However,
the fact that legislation is being passed should send a clear message to the courts
that legislatures feel the need to place more responsibility on banks for the safety
of ATM customers. To assist the courts in determining a bank's responsibility
for the safety of ATM customers, the extent to which other business invitors
have been liable for third party crimes against invitees provides a starting model.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO A BusINEss INvrroR's LIABILrrY IN
ANALoGOuS CASES

The relationship existing between a bank and an ATM patron is classified
as that of a premises owner and visitor, and more specifically, that of a business

invitor and business invitee."

Thus, the determination of a bank's liability to

82. GA. Code Ann. § 7-8-2(b) (Supp. 1994). The Georgia statute states the intent of the statute
is not to impose a duty to relocate or modify existing terminals upon the occurrence of any particular
events or circumstance, but rather to establish a good faith standard for evaluating ATMs. Id. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 19.174.010(Supp. 1994); CAL. FIN. CODE § 13031 (Supp. 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., FIN. INST. § 1-207(c)(3)(fii) (1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 714.280 (Supp. 1993); N.J.A.B.
1828, 206th Legis., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1994). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.961(2) (West Supp.
1995) (requiring the regulations to be implemented on all ATMs within one year of enactment).
83. Some of the statutes state that a violation is not negligence per se and impose fines for
infractions. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 655.961(2) (West Supp. 1995); N.Y.A.B. 11808, 215th N.Y.
Gen. Assem., 2d Sess., § 37-E (1995) (stating that not more than 500 hundred dollars may be
imposed for each violation).
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 332(1). An invitee is classified in one of two
categories, a public invitee and a business invitee. Id. The classification of public invitee designates
those invitees who are members of the public who are invited onto the invitor's premises for a public
purpose. Id. In contrast, the classification of business invitee designates those who are invited onto
the invitor's premises for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings which
the invitee has with the possessor of the land. Id. The Restatement defines an invitation as "any
words or conduct which lead or encourage the visitor to believe that his entry [onto the land] is
desired." Id. § 332 cmt. b.
Banks have been recognized as business invitors and their customers as business invitees.
Nigido v. First Nat'l Bank of Baltimore, 288 A.2d 127, 128 (Md. 1972); PROSSER, supra note 16,
at 419 (stating that a bank is a typical example of a business invitor) (citing Sinn v. Farmers'
Deposit Say. Bank, 150 A. 163 (Pa. 1930) and Howlett v. Dorchester Trust Co., 152 N.E. 895
(Mass. 1926)). Moreover, an ATM customer, to whom the bank has specifically invited by giving
a personalized ATM access card, has been encouraged to enter the bank's premises specifically for
bank business and therefore is a business invitee. See Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150,
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the ATM customer is properly examined under the traditional negligence
theories of premises owner liability as they apply to the business owner-invitee
relationship. Generally, a premises owner has a duty only to exercise
reasonable care to make the premises safe for visitor
and does not have a
duty to protect the visitor from the intentional criminal acts of a third person.s
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to make exceptions to this general
rule.' Numerous policy reasons have been given to justify adherence to this
view.'
In the past, this principle has been applied to the business owner
invitee relationship as well."
However, developments in tort law have
enabled tort victims to pursue claims against premises owners for injuries caused

1152-53 (III. App. Ct. 1992) (recognizing that the bank-ATM patron relationship was a business
invitor-invitee relationship).
85. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 425. The principles of the law of negligence are well settled
that an occupier of land is not an insurer of safety. Id. An occupier of land only has a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the protection of invitees who enter upon the occupier's land. Id.;
Treadway v. Ebert Motor Co., 436 A.2d 994, 997-98 (Pa. 1981). This duty entails only a
responsibility on the landowner to protect the invitee from that which creates an unreasonable risk
of harm. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 425. It also places a duty on the occupier to use reasonable
care not to injure the invitee by allowing or engaging in unreasonably dangerous or negligent
activities. Id. However, this responsibility also includes a measure of foreseeability, which places
on the premise owner the affirmative duty to inspect the premises in order to discover unreasonably
dangerous conditions. Id. at 425-26; Treadway, 436 A.2d at 998 (citing Annot., Modem Status of
Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party As Invitee, Licensee, or
Trespasser, 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970)). Further, the premises owner's duty to an invitee extends to
all areas of the premises open to the invitee including protection for a safe entrance to the property
and for a safe exit from the premises as well as all parts of the premises which the invitee might be
expected to use. PROSSER , supra note 16, at 424. When invitees enter areas which they have not
been encouraged or invited to use, the invitees become licensees with respect to conditions in such
area and may be entitled to less protection. Id. at 425.
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 315 (1986); Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); PROSSER, supra note 16, at 427. Foreseeability is the key factor in
determining the duty of a premises owner. See supra note 17.
87. Nappier, 666 S.W.2d at 860; Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 888-89; Young v. Huntsville
Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1389 (Ala. 1992); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418
N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1988).
88. Nappier, 666 S.W.2d at 860. Policy reasons for not imposing a duty upon business owners
to protect invitees against third party attacks include:
judicial reluctance to tamper with a traditional common law; the notion that the
deliberate criminal act of a third person is an intervening cause of harm to another; the
difficulty that often exists in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts; the
vagueness of the standard the owner must meet; the economic consequences of the
imposition of such a duty; and conflict with the public policy that protecting citizens
is the government's duty rather than a duty of the private sector.
Id. (citing Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. 1975)).
89. Id.
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by third parties which occur on the owner's premises. 9°
The victimization of business invitees by third parties is not a problem
unique to ATMs, but is a problem in analogous business invitor situations
including shopping malls, grocery stores, convenience stores, and civic
arenas. 9' The existing case law in these analogous situations has been used by
courts analyzing the liability of banks in negligence claims brought by injured

90. One such development was the attempt to remedy the problem ofjudgment-proofcriminals.
N. Jean Schendel, Note, Patientsas Victims-Hospital Liabiliryfor Third-Party Crime, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 419, 429-30 (1993). While tort victims were allowed to sue tortfeasors directly for
remedies to intentional torts, many of the tortfeasors were judgment-proof or unable to pay a
judgment against him or her. Id at 430. To remedy this problem, courts expanded theories of
liability to find premises owners liable on theories of negligence. Id. at 430 n.80 (citing Virginia
Cope, Third-PartyLiability, TRIAL, Oct. 1988, at 85.) In these actions, the victims were allowed
to file claims against the premises owners for breaches of a duty to protect invitees from the
dangerous conduct of third parties. Id.
Another development involves the changes in judicial attitudes toward the tort liabilities and
which have caused courts to abandon traditional negligence doctrines. Id. at 430-31. A variety of
theories have been suggested explaining the move away from traditional negligence doctrines. Id.
One theory is that courts are becoming more sympathetic to the plight of victims and responding to
the increasingly creative efforts of attorneys to secure recovery for tort victims. Id. at 430 n.88
(citing Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Charles W. Thomas, Third Party Tort Remedies for Crime
Victims-Searchingfor the "Deep Pocket" and a Risk Free Society, 18 STETSON L. REv. 1 (1988)).
Another theory proposes that the imposition of a duty on premises owners is an attempt by the courts
to address the nation's increasing crime rate. Id. at 430 n.89 and accompanying text. An additional
theory is that courts hope premises owners will respond to the duty by creating safer environments
for invitees. Id. at 430. Finally, some believe that the reasons for moving away from traditional
theories is the result of the changing attitude toward the goals of the negligence system. Id. at 431.
Those adhering to this belief advocate that the traditional concepts of negligence are inequitable
because plaintiffs are often left without recovery. Id. at 431 n.91 and accompanying text (citing
James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51
IND. L.J. 467, 483 (1976)). As a result of these developments, third party tort crime has flourished.
Id. at 431.
91. E.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993) (reviewing a rape
victim's negligence claim against a shopping center for failing to provide adequate security to protect
the plaintiff from an unreasonable risk of harm); McNeal v. Henry, 266 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978) (relating a negligence suit against a food store for the store's failure to prevent the
plaintiff from being shot while in the defendant's store); Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141
(N.J. 1982) (hearing a negligence claim brought by a customer against a store for injuries occurring
to the customer in the store parking lot); Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct.
App.) (reviewing a negligence cause-of-action against a 7-Eleven store brought by a plaintiff shot
while in the store); Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 461 N.E.2d 616 (111.App. Ct. 1984)
(reviewing a negligence action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the plaintiff's
injuries allegedly caused by the defendant's failure to provide adequate security at a civic arena
during a rock concert); Shaner v. Tuscon Airport Auth., Inc., 573 P.2d 518 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(hearing a negligence claim brought by a plaintiff against an airport for the death of the plaintiffs
wife by a third person in the airport parking lot); Davenport v. Nixon 434 So. 2d 1203 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (hearing a claim against a motel brought by a plaintiff who was robbed on the motel

premises).
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ATM customers.'e For this reason, analysis of the approaches used by courts
in these situations will illustrate the basis for the courts' current reasoning and
provide a basis for the proposed model reasoning. In analogous situations, some
courts have adopted the traditional no-duty approach to a business invitor's
duty." However, the current trend is to expand this approach and to recognize
a potential duty on business invitors to protect invitees.Y
A.

The No-Duty Approach

Courts which hold that premises owners do not have a duty to protect
invitees from harm by third parties rely on traditional policy reasons. 95 For
instance, courts adhering to the no-duty approach argue that requiring premises
owners to bear the responsibility for the security of their invitees would be too
great a burden." Other courts cite the prevalence of crime as a basis for
relieving business invitors of a duty to protect. 97 These courts state that
requiring business invitors to protect against third party crime based on the fact
that it may have been foreseeable, imposes a limitless burden on the invitor,
because crime is foreseeable virtually anywhere at anytime." Courts adhering

92. See generally, Miles, supra note 7, at 174-86 (describing the general principles of
landowner liability which underlie the courts' analyses in hearing ATM cases). See also supra note
20.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 95-112.
94. Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992) (stating that the growing
national trend in the law is toward expanding the recognition of premises owners' liability and to
recognize more exceptions to the traditional no duty rule); Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 883. See
also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 90 (listing the traditional policy reasons for not imposing a duty to protect
on business invitors); Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975).
96. Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 195. The court in Compropst stated that the proposed duty to
protect invitees was too vague and uncertain to impose on the business invitor. Id. at 193-94. The
court said that imposing such a duty to protect against the intentional acts of third parties would be
requiring more of the business invitor than is required of the community police. Id.; accord
Genovay v. Fox, 143 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958); Davis v. Allied Supermarkets,
Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976); McNeal v. Henry, 266 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978);
Maksinczak v. Salliotte, 364 N.W.2d 737 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of
Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1982); Pound v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 342 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1981).
97. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291,296-97 (N.J. 1962) (stating that the
uncertainty involved in calculating what measures would be sufficient to protect the invitee is too
large a task, thus refusing to require premises owners to assume such a duty); Cook v. Safeway, 354
A.2d 507, 509-10 (D.C. 1976) (refusing to hold a supermarket owner to a duty to protect shoppers
against third party crime due to the prevalence of crime); accord Williams v. Cunningham Drugs,
418 N.W.2d 381 (Mich. 1988); Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc., 121 N.W.2d 865 (Wis.
1963).
98. Goldberg, 186 A.2d at 297 (N.J. 1962) (stating that "everyone can foresee the commission
of crime virtually anywhere and at any time"); Williams, 418 N.W.2d at 384 (Mich. 1988) (stating
that "[tioday a crime may be committed anywhere and at any time").
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to the no-duty view claim that protecting against foreseeable crime would require
every business to assume the unrealistic duty to provide private security to patrol
the premises twenty-four hours a day."
One court stated that the no-duty position prevents limitless liability. In
Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark,"3 the New Jersey Supreme Court
found that the premises owner did not have a duty to protect an invitee against
third party criminal attack."1 Although both the jury and the appellate court
found that the premises owner did have a duty, the court found that such a
requirement would impose the limitless duty of preventing all crime."°2 The
court found that it would be impossible for a premises owner to be aware of
measures that would protect against all thugs, drug addicts, degenerates,
psychopaths, and psychotics; thus, the court did not require the premises owner
to make such an attempt.'0 3 Although the court said that third party crime was
foreseeable, to impose such a duty on premises owners would be unfair.°4

99. Goldberg, 186 A.2d at 297; Williams, 418 N.W.2d at 384.
100. 186 A.2d 291 (N.J. 1962). The Michigan Supreme Court relied on similar policy
justifications in adopting a no-duty approach in Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc. 418
N.W.2d 381, 384 (Mich. 1988) (stating that "[a defendant] cannot control the incidence of crime
in the community. Today a crime may be committed anywhere and at any time"). In Williams, the
court held in favor of the defendant-store owner, determining that the defendant did not have a duty
to provide a security guard to protect customers from third party criminal acts. Id. at 385. The
plaintiff, who was shot and robbed while in the defendant's store, alleged that reasonable care in a
high crime district of Detroit, required the presence of an armed security guard. Id. at 382.
Although the court recognized that both the Restatement of Torts and case law supported placing a
duty on a business invitor to protect invitees, the court refused to follow these authorities and
dismissed the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 384 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344, at 22324 (1986) and Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987)).
Interestingly, the defendant's store was located in a high crime area of Detroit, a factor that
neither the court nor the plaintiff utilized to evaluate the foreseeability of the plaintiff's injury. Id.
at 382. Also, although the store had previously maintained a plain-clothes security guard who was
not working on the day in question, the court did not address the issue of whether, by providing
security, the defendant had a duty to maintain adequate security. Id.
101. Goldberg, 186 A.2d at 297. In Goldberg, the plaintiff was beaten and robbed while
making a delivery to the defendant's premises. Id. at 291.
102. Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 296-97 (N.J. 1962).
103. Id. at 297 (stating that a duty to protect against third parties would impose the limitless
duty to protect against all crime).
104. Id. at 291, 293 (stating that if foreseeability gave rise to a duty to protect, then store
owners would unfairly have to provide "private arms" to protect invitees).
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Other courts explain the no-duty position in terms of unforeseeability. °5
For example, in Cook v. Safeway Stores, Incorporated, 6 the District of
Columbia Supreme Court found that a store owner did not have a duty to protect
an invitee against third party crimes. Despite the plaintiff's evidence that similar
crimes had occurred both on the premises and around the premises, the court
ruled that this evidence did not make the plaintiff's injury foreseeable. °7 In
addition, in lannelli v. Powers,"08 a New York court overturned a jury verdict
and held that an office building owner did not have a duty to protect a tenant
against being shot and killed by robbers. " Although the plaintiff alleged that
the owner knew that the robbers had previously entered the premises unlawfully,
the court found that the plaintiff's injury was unforeseeable and dismissed the
complaint." 0
The court acknowledged that other New York cases had

recognized a duty and conceded that a duty might exist if the plaintiff could
sufficiently prove foreseeability."' The court's concession coincides with the
105. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 889 (reporting that courts are reluctant to impose a duty on
business invitors due to the difficulty in foreseeing the criminal acts of others). See Davis v. Allied
Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976). In Davis, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found
that a defendant supermarket was not under a duty to protect a customer from being assaulted on
the store's premises. Id. at 964. Despite the evidence of the high crime rate in the surrounding
neighborhood and inadequate lighting at the store, the court found that the third party attack was
unforeseeable. Id. at 964-65.
The lack of foreseeability has often relieved premises owners of liability for injuries caused
to invitees by the intentional, criminal actions of third parties. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint
Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. 1981). The criminal acts have been considered to insulate the
business invitor from liability. Id. However, a number of courts have recognized that intervening
causes do not compel relieving a premises owner of a duty to protect invitees against third party
attacks. These courts find that in instances where the invitor had reason to know that a likelihood
of danger existed, the invitor has a duty to protect invitees from the third party crime. See id. at
38; Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 475 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981) (quoting Marguardt v.
Cemocky, 151 N.E.2d 109 (111.App. 1958) (stating that all intervening causes do not relieve a
premise owner of liability for harm occurring to invitees)); accord Peterson v. San Francisco Comm.
College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
106. 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. 1976).
107. Id. at 508, 510.
108. 498 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1986).
109. Id. at 381-82.
110. Id. at 379, 381.
111. Id. at 380-81. The court distinguished prior New York cases which had recognized a duty
on a business invitor, by stating that in the prior cases, there was evidence of previous criminal acts.
Id. (citing Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y.1980)); Miller v. State, 467
N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984); Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens, 73 A.D.2d 187, 189 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980); and Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 136 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)).
Although, there was evidence of prior criminal activity on the premises in lannelli, the court stated
that the evidence did not make the instant crime foreseeable. lannelli, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The
court also stated that the jury must have speculated in their findings, because the plaintiff had failed
to present testimony from a qualified expert regarding the adequacy of the defendant's security
measures. Id. at 382. But see Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1147 (N.J. 1982)
(stating that an expert witness is not necessary for the jury's determination of the adequacy of a
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trend toward broadening the approach to a business invitor's duty to protect
invitees against third party.conduct." 2
B. Recognition of a PotentialDuty on Premises Owners
While some courts have adhered to the traditional no-duty approach, the
majority of courts recognize exceptions in which business invitors have a duty
to protect invitees." 3 These courts focus on the foreseeability of the crime.
They hold that invitors have a duty when they know or have reason to know that
the future crime may occur." 4 However, these courts differ in their approach
to foreseeability."l 5 Three different approaches are used: (1) an approach that
requires evidence of special circumstances;" 6 (2) an approach that looks at the
totality of the circumstances;" 7 and (3) an approach that considers evidence
of prior criminal incidents on or near the premises."' While all three of the
approaches diverge from the no-duty theory, this Note argues that the last
approach, which considers evidence of prior related incidents to establish
foreseeability, should be used to determine a bank's duty for third party crimes
at ATMs.
1. Duty Dependent Upon Special Circumstances that Establish Foreseeability
Some courts have recognized an exception to the no-duty rule and have
found that a business invitor may have a duty to protect invitees under special

defendant's security measures).
112. See supra notes 14, 23 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 14, 23, and infra note 119 and accompanying text.
114. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 cmt. f. Comment f establishes the invitor's duty to
police the premises:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no
duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third
person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason
to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third
persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he
has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or
character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably
anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or
at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to
provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Id.
115. See Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the
courts are split as to what circumstances are necessary to create foreseeability).
116. See infra notes 119-40 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 150-74 and accompanying text.
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circumstances. "9 These courts hold that a duty may be imposed if special
For example, some
circumstances made the instant crime foreseeable.'"

courts have required evidence that the invitor knew the particular assailant or the
2
particular plaintiff in order to find the present crime foreseeable.' '
Conditioning foreseeability upon special circumstances increases the chances that

a plaintiff's claim will be dismissed, because no duty will be imposed unless the
plaintiff can prove that the business invitor knew the assailant's identity and
could predict the assailant's conduct.' "
A Missouri court used this high standard of foreseeability in Kelly v. Retzer
& Retzer, Incorporated."'3 In Kelly, the court required proof that the business
invitor had specific notice that the plaintiff would be the victim of a

119. Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Meadows v. Friedman R.R.
Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); McCoy v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 130 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1983); Gray v. McDonald's Corp., 874 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Savannah
College of Art & Design, Inc. v. Roe, 409 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. 1991); Matn v. Days Inns of Am., Inc.,
443 S.E.2d 290 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Reichenbach v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 401 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Kelly v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc., 417 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1982); Munn v.
Hardee's Food Sys., 266 S.E.2d 414, 415 (S.C. 1980).
120. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 891.
121. Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721-22 (finding that a store owner did not have notice since the
attacker had never before been on the owner's premises); Reichenbach, 401 So. 2d at 1368 (finding
that innkeeper did not have the prior notice that the specific plaintiff might be attacked or that the
specific attacker might commit such act); Kelly, 417 So. 2d at 560-61 (finding that the owner was
not on notice that the specific victim would be shot); Munn, 266 S.E.2d at 415 (finding that the store
owner did not know that the victim of a spontaneous shooting would be the plaintiff's decedent and
thus was not liable); Nappier, 666 S.W.2d at 862 (finding that a store owner must be aware of
specific crimes on the premises, aware of the identity of the dangerous individual, or aware of the
potential for the danger such that the owner had sufficient time to notify the police); Gray, 874
S.W.2d at 46 (finding that a premises owner is only liable when special circumstances exist such that
a plaintiff can show that a owner was on notice of the imminent probability of the act (citing Corbitt
v. Ringley-Crockett, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973)).
122. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 894-96 (stating that the special circumstances limited approach
to foreseeability gives "the trial judge a significant amount of power to deny the plaintiff's claim as
a matter of law"). Before the court will impose a duty, the judge must find that the time span
between the occurrence of the event and the notice of the event gave the defendant adequate time
to prevent the event. Id. In cases where the time span between the notice and the event is relatively
short, the plaintiff's claim will always be dismissed. Id.
E.g., Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721. In Meadows, the plaintiff was assaulted and shot on the
defendant-store owner's premises. Id. at 720. The court found the store owner did not have a duty
and dismissed the complaint. Id. at 722. The court stated that the store owner did not have a duty
to protect the invitee against third party crimes unless such person was under the control of the
invitor, unless the owner knew the assailant's identity, or unless the invitor had sufficient time to
avert the attack. Id. at 721. Although the plaintiff presented evidence of a history of past incidents
on the premises, the court stated that more 'specific evidence was needed, such as evidence that the
attacker had previously been on the defendant's premises. Id. at 722.
123. 417 So. 2d 556 (Miss. 1982).
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shooting. '2 The court did not recognize the plaintiff's evidence of sixteen
thefts, three incidents of vandalism, three assaults, one attempted fraud, and two
armed robberies, all of which occurred on the owner's premises in the three
years preceding the shooting, as sufficient to make the crime foreseeable.t"
Thus, the court did not impose a duty." Under this approach, a judge made
the factual determination of whether the prior incidents establish foreseeability.
When judges create high standards of foreseeability as in Kelly, foreseeability
will rarely be found, and the jury will never evaluate the facts surrounding the
crime.' 27
Other courts utilizing the special circumstances approach claim that
foreseeability is established when a plaintiff presents evidence of prior criminal
incidents on the premises. However, these courts stipulate that the prior
incidents must be 'substantially similar' to the plaintiff's incident to establish
foreseeability."
For example, in McCoy v. Gay,' a Georgia court held
that the foreseeability necessary to impose a duty on an innkeeper to protect the
plaintiff was not established, because the innkeeper did not have notice of the

124. Id. at 560.
125. Id. at 559-60.
126. Id.
127. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 896-97 (stating that under the requirements of the special
circumstances approach plaintiffs will rarely be able to withstand summary judgment). Plaintiffs with
evidence of general crime in the area or with evidence of prior incidents which are substantially
different from the plaintiff's incident will not be able to survive motions for dismissal or summary
judgment and will thus be prevented from presenting the issue of negligence to the jury. Id. at 894,
896-97. See Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721-22 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983) (stating that evidence that the premises were in a "high crime" area was not enough to
establish foreseeability); Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (requiring
that plaintiffs present evidence of specific crimes rather than evidence of general crime in the area);
Brown v. Nat'l Supermarkets, 679 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (requiring the plaintiff
to show evidence of specific crimes on the premises); McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 272
S.E.2d 592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (directing a verdict for the bank over plaintiff's evidence that
the police had responded to ten prior alarms at the defendant's bank).
128. McCoy v. Gay, 302 S.E.2d 130, 131-32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the prior
incidents must be substantially similar to the incident in question in order to show that the premises
owner had knowledge of the dangerous condition which resulted in the plaintiff's incident); Savannah
College of Art & Design, Inc. v. Roe, 409 S.E.2d 848, 849 (Ga. 1991) (finding that there had been
no prior incidents of sexual assault on the premises of a college thus the defendant did not have a
duty to protect patrons against the risk of sexual assault); Matt v. Days Inns of Am., Inc., 443
S.E.2d 290, 294-95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (arguing that prior substantially
similar incidents requires that the incident be the same crime and that the inflicting injury be
identical). C. Murphy v. Penn Fruit, 418 A.2d 480, 484 (Pa. Supp. Ct. 1980) (finding that the
occurrence of crimes anywhere on a business invitor's property might be sufficient to impose a duty
on the invitor to protect the invitee anywhere on the property).
129. 302 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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"sudden, unprovoked and unexpected criminal attack. ""'
The plaintiff
presented evidence of a prior purse snatching and robbery on the innkeeper's
premises."' The court found that the prior incidents were not substantially
similar to the plaintiff's, because the prior incidents occurred in close proximity
to the inn, whereas the plaintiff's assault occurred on the far edge of the parking
lot, some distance from the building.
Therefore, foreseeability was not
established, and the defendant had no duty to protect the plaintiff."
The result in Atamian v. Supermarkets General Corporation," further
demonstrates the inconsistencies that result from this strict approach to
foreseeability. In Atamian, a New Jersey court, in contrast to the Missouri
court's decision in Kelly, found that the plaintiffs evidence of only five prior
incidents on the defendants' premises was sufficient to establish foreseeability,
which thus created a duty on the business invitor to protect the plaintiff from
third party harm.' 35 Further, the Atamian court applied the substantial
similarity standard used by the McCoy court, but found that the incidents of
prior assault in the same parking lot as the plaintiffs rape were sufficiently
similar to satisfy the standard. "
Consequently, the New Jersey court,
applying the same analysis as Kelly and McCoy, concluded that the plaintiff's
evidence established foreseeability and found that the defendants had a duty to
37
protect invitees.
The inconsistent holdings of these three cases result from the significant
discretion given to trial judges under the special circumstances approach.'38
Under this approach, judges have taken on the function of the jury by
determining foreseeability. The factual determinations of what constitutes

130. Id. at 133. In McCoy, the plaintiff was attacked and robbed in the parking lot of an inn
after dining at the inn's lounge. Id. at 130.
131. Id.at 131.
132. Id. at 131-32 (finding that the two prior incidents did not meet the "similarity"
requirement so as to constitute a sufficient showing of knowledge on the inkeeper's part). Cf.
Murphy, 418 A.2d at 483-84 (stating that if enough muggings and purse snatchings occurred in a
parking lot, it was inevitable that someone would be hurt in the future, thus the premises owner
would have reason to know of the likelihood of the conduct of a third person).
133. Murphy v. Penn Fruit, 418 A.2d 480, 483-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (stating that without
a showing of substantial similarity, the evidence was irrelevant and the defendant was entitled to a
directed verdict).
134. 369 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
135. Id.at 43.
136. Id. at 40.
137. Id. at 40, 43. The court stated that "since additional criminal attacks should have been
anticipated, it is not unreasonable to infer that a reasonable security measure would have served as
a deterrent and that defendants' failure to take such measure constituted a substantial factor in the
assault on plaintiff." Id.at 43.
138. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 894-96.
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"substantially similar" and what length of time qualifies as "prior to the present
' Although
incident" have been solely within the discretion of the trial judge. 39
cases such as McCoy and Kelly do broaden the foreseeability requirement from
the no-duty rule by recognizing that prior acts may give rise to a duty to protect,
the courts' narrow interpretation of these requirements still prevents most cases
from reaching the jury." Contrary to the narrow view of foreseeability under
the special circumstances approach, other courts have overexpanded the
interpretation of foreseeability. These courts have found that not only does the
duty to protect require foreseeability, but that it also requires a number of
additional factors.
2.

Duty Dependent on the Totality of the Circumstances

An approach used primarily by the California courts takes an expansive
view of notice and the business invitor's duty to protect invitees against third
party crimes.' 4'
The courts applying this approach find that while the
foreseeability of future harm is important to establish the element of duty, it is
not the only factor considered in analyzing a business invitor's duty. 142 These
courts expand the analysis of a business invitor's duty to include a number of
factors in addition to foreseeability, such as: the degree of certainty that the
invitee was injured, the connection between the business invitor's conduct and
the invitee's injury, the moral blame of the invitor's actions, the social policy
of preventing future harm, the burden to the invitor, the consequences of the
duty to the community, and the availability and cost of insurance for the risk
involved. "
While the special circumstances approach interprets foreseeability too
narrowly, the totality of the circumstances approach interprets foreseeability too

139. Id. (providing examples of instances in which the court used its discretion to find that the
defendant did not have a duty to the plaintiff despite prior violent acts). See also supra notes 123-37
and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
141. See Isaacs v. HuntingtonMem. Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659 (Cal. 1985) (stating that courts
which require evidence of similar prior incidents improperly remove too many cases from the jury's
rightful consideration of foresecability). The courts applying this approach have been mainly
California courts. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1968); Peterson v. San Francisco Comm. College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); Isaacs
v. Huntington Mem. Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985); Southland Corp. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984). However, South Dakota and Idaho have also used this approach. See Sharp
v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990); Small v. McKennan Hosp., 403 N.W.2d 410
(S.D. 1987); see generally Collins, supra note 14, at 104-11 (discussing South Dakota's adoption
of the totality of the circumstances approach).
142. Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
143. Id. at 576 (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
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broadly. This approach infringes on the jury's function. A number of the
factors used by the court to assess a business invitor's duty overlap with the
jury's subsequent determination of negligence.'" For example, "the closeness
of connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered" is part
of the jury's evaluation of proximate cause. 5 Also, allowing the judge to
decide "the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury" infringes on the
jury's determination of the plaintiff's actual loss or resulting damage. 4 Also,
the "moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct" overlaps with the jury's
assessment of the particular standard of conduct required, since the jury
considers the moral accountability of the defendant's conduct in assessing what
standard of conduct the community requires of the defendant. 47
The totality of the circumstances approach does allow plaintiffs to avoid the
strict limits on foreseeability under the special circumstances approach.
However, the courts using the totality of the circumstances approach overextend
the concept of notice by accepting general evidence of crime as sufficient to
establish foreseeability. For example, in Cohen v. Southland Corporation,"
a California court allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of crime statistics of
a nationwide convenience store to establish that the owner of a convience store
had notice of the possibility of future crime at his store. 49 The court's
acceptance of crime statistics which occurred neither on nor near the store
owner's premises expands the duty of a business invitor too far. Such an

144. See supra note 29 (discussing the factors required to establish negligence).
145. Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 611 (1st Cir. 1955) (stating that the jury decides
"whether the causal relation between the negligent act and the plaintiff's harm . . .is sufficiently
close to make it just and expedient to hold the defendant" liable); Watson v. Kentucky & Ind. Bridge
& Ry., 126 S.W. 146, 150 (Ky. 1910) (stating that it is for the jury to decide if the connection of
cause and effect is established); PROSSER, supra note 16, at 263 (stating that the "connection
between the act and omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered
• . . is called 'proximate cause' or 'legal cause'").

146. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 328C (stating that in a negligence action the jury
determines "the amount of compensation for legally compensable harm" to the plaintiff).
147. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 237 (stating that the jury judges the defendant's conduct
by what the community requires). The determination of the defendant's moral blame is encompassed
in the jury's determination of whether the defendant breached his duty. Francis H. Bohlen, Mired
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 111-13 (1923) (stating that the jury determines
how the defendant ought to have acted).
148. 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
149. In Cohen, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's injury was unforeseeable because no
armed robberies resulting in injury had occurred at that particular store. Id. at 576-77. However,
the court found that the armed robbery was statistically foreseeable based on a study which showed
that there was one robbery or more per store per year and that 80% of 7-Eleven stores were the
subject of armed robberies. Id. at 577. In addition, the California court further expanded the
analysis of notice from mere foreseeability to include "whatever is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of it in guiding practical
conduct." Id. at 578 (quoting Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal. App. 3d 622, 629 (1983)).
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expansion requires business invitors to foresee crime not only on their own
premises, but also nationwide. As a result, the totality of the circumstances
approach would require business invitors in rural, low crime areas to foresee
crimes occurring in urban, high crime areas.
However, an alternative to the totality of the circumstances approach is
available. A third approach to duty strikes a balance between the broad view
of foreseeability, under the totality of the circumstances approach, and the
narrow view, under the special circumstances approach. Courts adhering to the
third view have broadened the requirements for foreseeability, by recognizing
that evidence other than special circumstances may establish foreseeability. This
approach recognizes that prior criminal incidents on or around the business
invitor's premises may constitute foreseeability. Unlike the totality of the
circumstances, this approach avoids infringing on the jury's subsequent analysis
of negligence because the duty analysis considers the sole factor of
foreseeability.
3. Duty Dependent on Related Prior Incidents Establishing Foreseeability
The trend among the courts is in favor of a broader approach to duty which
does not limit foreseeability to special circumstances. " Under this view,
courts hold that evidence of prior incidents which are related to the business
invitor's premises, (incidents which occur on or near the premises,) creates a
jury question as to the foreseeability of the future crime.15' When the jury
finds that the evidence sufficiently establishes foreseeability, the court will rule

150. There is a growing trend in the law to expand the recognition of foreseeability and a
business invitor's duty. E.g., Young v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. 1992);
Comastro v. Village of Rosemont, 461 N.E.2d 616 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co.,
418 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36 (N.C. 1981); Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen.
Corp., 369 A.2d 38, (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1980); Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981); Butler v. Acme
Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141 (N.J. 1982); Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (111.
1988); Kenny v. Southeastern Penn. Transp., 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1978); Alonge v. Rodriguez, 279 N.W.2d 207 (Wis. 1979); Whelchel v. Strangways, 550 P.2d
1228 (Or. 1981); Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979);
Parslow v. Pilgrim Parking, Inc., 362 N.E.2d 933 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977); see Yelnosky, supranote
13, at 897 (stating that more jurisdictions are accepting a broader interpretation of foreseeability
which considers occurrences other than prior similar incidents and fewer jurisdictions are taking the
narrow approaches which keep the case from the jury).
151. Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 418 A.2d 480, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that
evidence of crimes in the immediate surrounding area could be enough for a jury to conclude that
the premises owner had a duty to take precautions against criminal attacks by third parties); Young
v. Huntsville Hosp., 595 So. 2d 1386, 1389 (Ala. 1992) (stating that the risk of future crime was
reasonably foreseeable because "the resulting crime was one the general risk of which was
foreseeable," and that the foreseeability issue should be presented to the jury).
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that the business invitor had a duty to protect the invitee. 5 2 As a result, more
cases will survive summary judgment, and will ultimately go to the jury for an
evaluation of liability." 3
To support their expansion from the narrower approaches, these courts rely
on the Restatement of Torts. The duty imposed by section 315 of the
Restatement exists in special relationships, rather than in special
circumstances."
The relationship between a business invitor and business
invitee qualifies as a special relationship under section 314A of the
Restatement. 55 Section 344 expands the potential duty of the business invitor
to include protecting invitees from the intentional acts of third parties.'1According to comment f of section 344, this duty exists in situations where the
likelihood of future criminal activity is foreseeable.' 57 This analysis of

152. See infra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
154. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 315. Under § 315, the finding of a special relationship
may be sufficient to 6reate a duty to protect against the intentional acts of third parties.
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless,
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty
upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a
right to protection.
Id.
155. REsTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 314A. Section 314 states that "a possessor of land who
holds it open to the public is under a . . . duty to members of the public who enter in response to
his invitation" to protect those individuals against unreasonable risks of harm. Id.
156. Id. at § 344. Section 344 establishes that an invitor has a duty to invitees to protect them
against an unreasonable risk of physical harm:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes
is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
Id. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 201-02 (stating that the relationship between a business invitor and
business invitee generates a special responsibility upon the defendant for the protection of the
plaintiff against the misconduct of others); RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 314A (listing the
business invitor-business invitee as a special relationship giving rise to a duty); HENDERSON, supra
note 14, at 449 (stating that the general duty of reasonable care may be raised because of the
existence of a special relationship between the parties).
157. Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 898; RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344. Comment f sets
out a business owner's duty to police the premises:
Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety, he is ordinarily under no
duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third
person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason
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foreseeability increases the number of situations in which a business invitor may
have a duty to protect an invitee. For example, comment f does not limit an
invitor's duty to incidents where the identity of a particular individual is
foreseeable, but rather requires only that the business invitor foresee the
potential for future criminal conduct in light of past general criminal
activity."5
Relying on section 344, courts applying this approach to foreseeability do
not require the invitor to predict the exact location or exact type of crime.'59
Unlike the special circumstances approach," e this approach acknowledges that
prior incidents related to the invitor's premises may establish foreseeability and
ultimately duty.' 6'
For example, in Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear,
Incorporated,' the New York Supreme Court reinstated the plaintiff's claim
against the owner of an office building based on the evidence of 107 previously
reported crimes in the building in the twenty-one months preceding the
plaintiff's shooting." Although the plaintiff was shot in the lobby, the court
found that a history of crime anywhere in the building may have made crime

to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third
persona in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he
has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or
character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably
anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or
- at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to
provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Id.
158. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 cmt. f; supra note 157.
159. Morgan v. Bucks, 428 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co.,
418 A.2d 480, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
160. See supra notes 123-33 (discussing cases in which the court denied that the defendant had
a duty despite evidence of prior incidents).
161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344; supra note 157. E.g., Morgan, 428 F. Supp. at 550
(stating that "it is not necessary for [business invitors] to be specifically aware of the exact location
on their premises where patrons might be injured by the tortious acts of third persons" and that a
showing that the invitor had constructive notice was enough to establish a jury question as to
foresecability); Murphy, 418 A.2d at 483. The plaintiff in Murphy did not present evidence of any
violent crimes on the defendant's premises but did present evidence of car thefts, muggings, purse
snatches, drug use, disturbances, and panhandling in the neighborhood. Id. Despite the defendant's
protest to the evidence, the court held that under § 344 of the Restatement of Torts, the "exact locale
of prior crimes is immaterial insofar as appellant's ... duties are concerned." Id. See Comastro
v. Village of Rosemont, 461 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (imposing a duty on the owners
of a civic arena to protect concert attenders due to the owner's knowledge of the trouble encountered
at other arenas where the rock group had performed).
162. 407 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1980).
163. Id. at 458.
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anywhere in the building foreseeable.'"
A Pennsylvania court in Murphy v. Penn Fruit Company'6 also
considered prior related incidents. The court in Murphy upheld a jury verdict
for a plaintiff who was accosted ad stabbed by two youths in the parking lot of
the defendant's grocery store. I" Although no evidence of prior violent crimes
on the defendant's premises was presented, the court found that the evidence of
prior purse snatchings and muggings around the defendant's premises created
a jury question as to foreseeability.'" Moreover, the court stated that if the
jury found that the incidents occurring in the immediate vicinity established
foreseeability, a duty would be imposed on the invitor to protect invitees.',
Under the prior related incidents approach, the plaintiff need not prove that
the business invitor foresaw the plaintiff's exact injury and how it would
occur, 19or
that the invitor knew the identity of the third party assailant."7
Rather, the plaintiff need only show evidence of prior related criminal incidents
to avoid summary judgment and generate a jury question as to
foreseeability 7'
Whether the business owner should have foreseen the

164. Id. The court stated that if the jury found that the building owner knew of or should have
known of the prior criminal incidents in his building, then it would be reasonable for the jury to find
that the defendant should have anticipated the risk of future harm and taken precautionary measures
to avoid such risk. Id.
165. 418 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 484. The Murphy court held that in light of the past criminal acts on neighboring
premises, a jury could reasonably conclude that the instant crime was reasonably foreseeable. Id.
at 483-84. Likewise, the court in Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1991),
concluded that the plaintiff's evidence that the defendant's business was in a "high crime" area
created a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff. Id. at
477. The court said that the particular standard of care and the determination of whether the
defendant had breached this standard were both questions for the jury to resolve. Id.
168. Murphy, 418 A.2d at 483-84. The court stated that "if enough purse snatches occurred
in and around the store, it was inevitable that someone would be hurt," thus the defendant would
have a duty to prevent such occurrence or to at least post a warning. Id. at 484. The court said that
the premises owner may "know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a
likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety
of a visitor." Id. (quoting Morgan v. Bucks Assoc., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977)).
169. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981); Murphy v. Penn
Fruit Co., 418 A.2d 480, 483 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); see also Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531
N.E.2d 1358, 1369 (111.1988) (stating that a lack of prior crimes would not relieve the business
invitor of his duty when the invitor was aware of the potential of a third party attack on the
plaintiff).
170. Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
171. See Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 476 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss1/3

DeYoung: ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial Approach to a Bank's Liability

1995]

ATM CRIME

133

plaintiff s injury in light of the evidence will then be determined by the jury."
In summary, the preceding approaches play a significant role in assessing
the duty of a bank to victims of ATM crime. Due to the shortage of case law
dealing with ATM crime and the unique features of the bank-ATM patron
relationship," courts hearing ATM cases have little guidance in ascertaining
a bank's duty to protect ATM patrons against third party crimes. Of these
approaches, the best approach to a business invitor's duty is one that strikes a
balance between expanding the scope of foreseeability and overextending the
standard.
Many courts have found that the approach which conditions
foreseeability upon a showing of prior related incidents of criminal activity best
strikes this balance." 4 This Note proposes that courts should use an approach
like the prior related incidents approach to analyze ATM crime cases.
Under this Note's proposed approach, courts hearing ATM cases should
find that evidence of prior related incidents may satisfy the threshold level of
evidence required to establish a jury question as to the foreseeability of an ATM
crime. This approach would prevent unduly burdening business invitors with
the duty to foresee nationwide crime, because in order to generate a jury
question as to foreseeability, plaintiffs would have to present evidence of prior
incidents on or near the business invitor's premises. If the jury found that the
foreseeability threshold was met, the business invitor would have a duty to
protect patrons from criminal attacks while using the bank's ATM. The
question of whether this duty was breached would then be determined by the
jury before liability would be imposed. Under the proposed approach, liability
would ultimately arise from the results of a flexible balancing test employed by
the jury. This balance would allow the jury to use a cost-benefit analysis to
determine liablility. Currently, courts hearing ATM crime cases do not use such
an approach. These courts have used approaches similar to the special
circumstances approach and have interpreted foreseeability narrowly.
IV. CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ATM CASES
Despite the trend in other business invitor cases to expand the limits of
foreseeability, 7 5 the courts assessing a bank's duty to protect ATM patrons

172. Foster, 281 S.E.2d at 40 (stating that evidence showing that the defendant should have
foreseen that "consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected" was sufficient
to allow the plaintiff to present her case to the jury).
173. See discussion supra notes 57-67. Infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 150 (citing courts which have used this approach).
175. See supra notes 14, 23, 150 and accompanying text.
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have taken a narrow approach to foreseeability. 76 As a result of the courts'
current view of foreseeability, with the exception of two lower courts,'" the
majority of the courts have held that banks do not have a duty to protect ATM
customers against third party crime."
The majority of plaintiffs in ATM
crime cases have not been able to defeat motions for dismissal or summary
judgment because of the courts' limited requirements for foreseeability. 79 The
courts hearing ATM crime cases either condition foreseeability on limited
special circumstances or create a high threshold of foreseeability.
Similar to the special circumstances approach,se courts that have assessed
a bank's duty to protect patrons against ATM crimes have placed strict
qualifications on the type of evidence which establishes notice of the ATM
crime.181
For example, in Page v. American National Bank & Trust

176. See infra notes 180-209 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictions courts have
placed on foreseeability in deciding ATM cases).
177. See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
178. Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1989) (dismissing the plaintiff-ATM
patron's negligence claim against the defendant-bank for armed robbery at the bank's ATM); Dyer
v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 588 N.Y.S.2d 499, 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d
390 (N.Y. 1993) (dismissing a plaintiff's negligence claim against a bank for liability for the armed
robbery of the plaintiff at the bank's ATM); Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150, 1151
(11. App. Ct. 1992) (dismissing a class action seeking to enjoin the operation of the defendant's
ATMs after numerous third-party criminal attacks); Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850
S.W.2d 133, 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor
of a defendant-bank on a claim against the bank for the injuries caused to the plaintiff by a third
party while using the bank's ATM); Fuga v. Comerica Bank of Detroit, 509 N.W.2d 778, 780
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (granting summary judgment in favor of a bank on a claim against the bank
for a plaintiff's injuries caused by a third party attack at the bank's ATM); Faulkner v. Sun Bank
of S. Fla., 532 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming a summary judgment
motion in favor of the defendant-bank for a suit filed by a plaintiff after being robbed at gunpoint
at the bank's ATM).
But see Gillen v. Delaware Trust Co., 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 332 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993),
in which the court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion based on the plaintiff's
evidence of prior incidents at the bank and nationwide crime statistics. Id. at 334. Although the
court found that the prior related incidents created a jury question as to foreseeability, the court
considered this evidence solely to rule on the bank's motion for partial summary judgment on
punitive damages. Id. at 336.
179. See supra note 178.
180. See supra section IU.B.1.
181. Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1989). In Williams, the Alabama
Supreme Court recognized that invitors may have a duty to protect invitees but limited this duty to
exceptional circumstances. Id. at '27. The plaintiff was assaulted on the bank's premises after
withdrawing money from the bank's drive-up ATM. Id. at 26. The criminal approached the
plaintiff's car, pointed a gun at her through her window, and grabbed her money. Id. Despite the
evidence of robberies at that ATM, the court found that foreseeability was not established. Id. at
27. The court based its finding on a previous case in which it had refused to adopt a "special duty"
on the part of the banking industry. Id. In addition, the court stated that it never found a case
which fit the special circumstances necessary to establish foreseeability and impose a duty to protect
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Company," a Tennessee court held that the evidence of prior criminal
incidents on the premises would not establish foreseeability unless the evidence
proved that the bank could have foreseen the identity of the assailant.In The
court found that the identity of the assailant was not foreseeable and dismissed
the plaintiffs complaint.'"w A Michigan court placed a similar qualification
on foreseeability in Fuga v. Comerica Bank.'8 In Fuga, the court narrowed
foreseeability further by requiring not only evidence that the bank had notice of
the assailant's identity, but also evidence that the bank failed to end a crime
which occurred in the presence of its employees. 186 Under the approaches of
Page and Fuga, a plaintiff would only be able to establish foreseeability when
the bank knew the third party prior to the attack, or when the criminal attack
occurred when bank personnel were present to stop the crime.
Similar to the special circumstances approach, the approach utilized by
another court led to the finding that evidence of crime on property surrounding
the bank's premises did not establish foreseeability of ATM crime."s In Popp
v. Cash Station, Incorporated,ss an Illinois court held that to establish
foreseeability the plaintiff must present evidence of prior criminal incidents

on a business invitors. Id. (stating that "we have not yet found the 'exceptional case' that warranted
the imposition" of a duty on a business invitor to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from
criminal attack).
182. 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
183. Id. at 136-37 (citing to Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975)).
In Page, the plaintiff was using an ATM, accompanied by her son and two friends, when she was
assaulted and robbed. Id. at 133. Although the plaintiff presented evidence of five prior robberies
at that ATM, the court found that since there was no proof that the unknown assailants had been on
the bank premises prior to the assault, foresecability was not established. Id. at 139.
184. Id. at 138-39, 140 (stating that the bank did not have a duty to protect ATM patrons
against unidentified offenders). The court did refer to Section 344 of Restatement of Torts and
acknowledged that the section placed a duty on business owners to protect the invitees from third
party criminal acts. Id. at 137. However, the court stated that the standard set forth by Section 344
was far from clear and that it would be unfair to impose this vague duty on banks. Id. This
reasoning is similar to that taken by courts following the no-duty approach. See supra notes 96-104
and accompanying text (discussing the limits imposed on foreseeability under the no-duty approach);
see also infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing additional reasoning used by the
court in Page).
185. 509 N.W.2d 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
186. See id.at 779 (stating that in order to impose a duty on the bank, the criminal act must
have occurred when employees were present to prevent such act). The court also stated that a duty
may be imposed if the bank created or maintained the criminal activity. Id. Since the bank neither
created nor maintained the activity, the court found that to hold the bank responsible for protecting
invitees from the acts of third parties would "place upon the landowner a greater burden than that
which is placed upon the community for the protection of its members." Id.
187. See Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 1150 (111.App. Ct. 1992). See supra section
HI.B.I for discussion regarding the limitations placed on foreseeability under the special
circumstances approach.
188. 613 N.E.2d 1150 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
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occurring on the bank's premises.'" Seeking to enjoin the operation of a
chain of ATMs, the plaintiff presented statistics of the 1500 to 5000 criminal
attacks which occur annually at ATMs nationwide." 9 Contrary to what the
totality of the circumstances approach would have yielded,' 9" the approach
followed by the Illinois court led to the finding that evidence of general crime
statistics was insufficient to establish foreseeability. 192
When evidence of prior incidents on the premises has been presented,
courts have raised the threshold requirements of foreseeability. 93 For
example, in Williams v. FirstAlabama Bank,"9 the Alabama Supreme Court
recognized that a duty to protect may exist when the bank had notice that future
criminal activity could endanger a customer. -' However, despite the evidence
of two previous similar robberies at that same ATM two months before the
attack on the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff's injury was not
foreseeable and found that the bank did not have a duty to protect the
plaintiff. 196 While the Court in Williams found two prior incidents on the
premises insufficient, the Tennessee Supreme Court required an even higher
standard of foreseeability in Page.1" In Page, the court found the ATM
crime unforeseeable despite evidence that five prior crimes occurred at the same
ATM, including that another customer was assaulted and shot, that the ATM
was in a high-crime neighborhood, and that the Chattanooga Crime Prevention

189. See Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1152-53. C. McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 272
S.E.2d 592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that evidence of previous crimes in the same bank

parking lot was required in order to prevent a directed verdict for the bank).
190. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1153. In Popp, the plaintiff was not a victim of ATM crime but was
a concerned customer who, in light of the numerous past ATM crimes in Chicago, filed a class
action against the ATM chain, seeking to improve current security measures at Chicago ATMs. Id.
at 1151.
191. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
192. Popp, 613 N.E.2d at 1153.
193. The courts set such a high standard of foreseeability that evenunder the current approach,
evidence of prior acts on the premises do not establish foresseabilty, thus the banks have been found
to have no duty to protect ATM customers from third party attacks and have been relieved of
liability. See Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 138, 140 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim despite the plaintiff's evidence of five similar previous
crimes at the same bank branch ATM); see supra text accompanying notes 182-83.
194.1545 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1989).
195. Williams, 545 So. 2d at 27.
196. Id. (finding that a duty would only exist when the plaintiff could show an increase in the
number and frequency of the crimes on the bank's premises).
197. Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); see
supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing additional findings made by the court in
Page).
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Bureau warned the bank that the area was particularly inviting to criminals.'"
Similar to the special circumstances approach, these courts have created a high
standard of foreseeability which few plaintiffs can meet.'" Furthermore, the
courts have been making factual determinations of whether the evidence
establishes foreseeability, which is a function normally delegated to the jury." °
Contrary to the majority view, two lower New York courts have recognized
Although these
a duty on banks to protect patrons against ATM crime."
courts use a broader approach to determine forseeability and duty, like the
courts using the totality of the circumstances approach, they overextend the
analysis of duty. For example, in Oppenheimer v. Chase Manhattan Bank of
North America, Incorporated,? a New York County Civil Court found that
a bank had a duty to protect an elderly man who was robbed while using the
bank's ATM.3
Although no evidence of prior criminal incidents had
occurred on or around the defendant's premises, the court relied on the
inherently dangerous nature of an ATM to conclude that foreseeability was
established.'
Similarly, in Stalzer v. European American Bank,' the New
York Civil Court of Queens County found that a bank had a duty based on the
bank's general knowledge of nationwide ATM crime. 2 6 Like the courts'
following the reasoning of the totality of the circumstances approach, these
courts reasoning under the current approach encroaches on the jury's

198. Page, 850 S.W.2d at 138. Compare McClendonv. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 272 S.E.2d
592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). InMcClendon, the plaintiff was attacked in a bank parking lot in
mid-afternoon. Id. at 593. The Georgia court found that ten prior incidents at the bank which
required police involvement were insufficient to establish notice on the part of the bank. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 119-27.
200. See infra text accompanying notes 231-47.
201. Oppenheimer v. Chase Manhattan Bank of N. Am. (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984), quoted in Harry
H. Lipsig, Tort Trends: Duty of Banks to Safeguard Customers, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1984, at 1;
Stalzer v. European Am. Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
202. Lipsig, supra note 201, at 1.
203. Id.
204. Id. (stating that "[tihe robbery of a person using the services of a bank, including an
automatic money machine, is clearly foreseeable even if there were no prior robberies of a particular
type at that branch").
205. 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
206. Id. at 634-36. The court found that the bank's knowledge of the numerous ATM robberies
recently covered by the media was sufficient to establish foreseeability. Id. The court stated that:
Given the very nature of a bank and the business it does in considering the many recent
media-documented robbery attempts and completions, it seems reasonable to conclude
that banking invites certain very real risks to the public at large. Whether the crime
be one of random violence or a deliberate, planned attack, bank robberies seem to be
a fact of everyday life, committed by persons of all ages and by amateurs and
professionals alike.
Id. at 635.
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determination of fact by deciding foreseeability. 7 In addition, a more recent
decision from a higher New York court weakens the weight of these decisions.
In Dyer v. Norstar Bank, N.A.,'
a New York Appellate Court applied a
traditional no-duty approach, establishing that New York currently takes a
narrow approach to foreseeability and duty.'
In summary, the majority of the courts deciding ATM crime cases have
applied a narrow approach to foreseeability and duty.2"' Under the current
approach, courts have applied strict limits as well as placed high standards on
foreseeability. This approach gives the trial judge the power to determine
foreseeability, which should be determined by the jury.2 ' Resolving whether
evidence of prior related incidents establishes foreseeability requires making
findings of fact which is the function of the jury." 2 Furthermore, under these
high standards, ATM crime cases have been dismissed even when evidence or
prior related incidents may have established foreseeability.213 What is needed
is a broader, more flexible analysis, in which courts recognize that evidence of
prior related incidents should be evaluated by the jury to determine
foreseeability.
Under the proposed model approach, general evidence of crime unrelated
to the bank's premises such as nationwide crime statistics, would not be enough
to establish foreseeability. Thus, when a plaintiff has only general evidence of
crime, no duty should be imposed and the complaint should be dismissed.
However, when a plaintiff presents evidence of crimes on or near the bank's
premises, the evidence should be presented to the jury for a determination of
foreseeability. A duty would only be imposed on a bank if the jury found that
the prior related incidents were sufficient to make the instant ATM crime
foreseeable. However, even if a duty was found, liability will not automatically
follow. Whether a bank is liable should be determined by the jury through a
flexible balancing test of the competing interests. Unlike the current approach,
this approach to ATM crime cases takes a broader view of foreseeability and

207. See supra section IH.B.2.
208. 588 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1993).
209. Id. at 499. In Dyer, the court found that the defendant-bankdid not have a duty to protect

the ATM victim because "the fact that a person using an ATM might be subject to robbery is
conceivable, but conceivability is not the equivalent of foreseeability." Id. The court dismissed the
ATM victim's complaint and stated that to hold the bank liable for the injury caused to the plaintiff
by a third party would stretch foreseeability "beyond acceptable limits." Id.
210. See supra note 178.
211. See infra notes 231-47 and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. See Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)
and Williams v. First Al. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26 (Ala. 1989); see supra text accompanying notes 194200.
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duty. Currently, the judges hearing ATM cases are making determinations of
fact and in so doing are construing foreseeability too narrowly. Such an
approach contradicts basic tort policies as well as public policy.
V. THE CURRENT NARROW TREATMENT OF BANK LiABILrrY CONTRADICTS
TORT POLICIES AND PUBLIC POLICY

This Note argues that the current treatment of a bank's liability for ATM
crimes is too narrow and a broader, more flexible approach should be used." 4
Instead of following a narrow no-duty or special circumstances approach, 5
the courts should broaden the current approach to recognize that evidence of
prior related incidents may establish foreseeability. The court should allow the
jury to determine if the prior related criminal incidents establish foreseeability.
As a result, more instances of a duty to protect patrons against third party crime
at ATMs may be imposed on banks.2" 6 However, this result would not
necessitate more instances of liability. Whether the bank breached the duty
would still need to be determined by the jury.2"' This would be done using
a balancing test which would weigh the gravity of the ATM crime and the
likelihood of occurrence against the burden imposed on the bank and the social
utility of the service.2" 8 This prior related incidents approach would allow for
each ATM crime case to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.2" 9 Under
courts' current narrow analysis, banks have been relieved of liability when
evidence of prior related incidents may have made the ATM crime
foreseeable.'
In addition, judges have made these decisions when they
should have been made by the jury." This has resulted in the construction
of stricter standards of foreseeability than necessary.

214. See discussionsupra section IV.
215. See supra section lIM.A and III.B.1.
216. By recognizing that prior incidents related to a bank's property should be presented to the
jury, courts would not be able to grant summary judgment for the bank in the face of such evidence.
See infra text accompanying notes 231-47. In cases such as Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 850 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) and Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26 (Ala.
1989), the courts would not have been able to rule no-duty as a matter of law, because evidence of
prior related incidents was presented in both cases. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200.
217. See infra section VI.B.
218. See infra section VI.B.
219. See generally section VI.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200.
221. See infra section VI.B.
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A. The CurrentApproach Construes ForeseeabilityToo Narrowly
The current approaches used to determine a bank's duty should be rejected
because these approaches construe the requirements of duty more narrowly than
necessary. Whether an individual has a duty to protect another depends upon
whether the relationship between the parties generates a legal obligation to
protect the other.'
In the relationship between a business invitor and a
business invitee, the Restatement of Torts defines the legal obligation of a
Section 344 clearly places an affirmative duty
business owner to invitees.'
on a bank, as an occupier of a premises holding it open for business purposes,
to take reasonable care to discover that the dangerous conduct of third persons
is occurring or is likely to occur on the premises.? Furthermore, section 344
requires that a bank take reasonable precautions to protect invitees from the
conduct of third persons.225
The reasoning of the courts analyzing a bank's duty in ATM cases is
similar to the reasoning used by courts following the no-duty and special
circumstances approaches. 6 However, the reasoning of these approaches
incorrectly interprets section 344. These approaches rely on the belief that when
special circumstances do not exist, future crime is not foreseeable, and therefore
no duty exists.'
However, under these approaches, the courts create a higher

222. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 236.
223. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344; see infra note 224.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 344. Section 344 states:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes
is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise
reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
Id.; see also Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1144 (N.J. 1982) (stating that "[o]wners
and occupiers of land make up the largest single group upon whom the duty of affirmative conduct
has been imposed"); Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981) (stating
that comment f to § 344 "imposes a duty on the possesssor of land to police business premises to
protect invitees, although no such duty previously existed under the common law"); accordMurphy
v. Penn Fruit Co., 418 A.2d 480, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint
Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (N.C. 1981); Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 549 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
225. See supra note 224.
226. See supra notes 95-112, 119-40 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing that the special circumstances
approach requires knowledge of the assailant's identity). See Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 613
N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (holding that generally known ATM crime statistics did not
make future criminal attacks at ATMs foreseeable for purposes of imposing a duty); Williams v.
First Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1989) (holding that the criminal activity was not reasonably
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threshold of foreseeability than is actually necessary. The foreseeability
standard, under section 344, does not require the bank to know the identity of
the third party or to anticipate the specific nature of the crime, as required by
these courts.'
Rather, comment f to section 344 states that foreseeability
may be based on a business invitor's past experience. 29 Such past experience
may require a bank to foresee future conduct by a third party even when an
invitor has no reason to expect criminal action on the part of any particular third
party.'
Based on a plain reading of comment f, evidence of prior criminal
incidents on or near a bank's premises would constitute past experience and may
establish foreseeability. Thus, this evidence should be presented to the jury to
evaluate foreseeability, before the court rules on a bank's duty.
B. A Narrow Approach Encroacheson the Jury's Function of Assessing Notice
Using a narrow approach to assess a bank's duty fails to separate the
functions of judge and jury. Though these functions often overlap, 23 this
overlap should not serve as a justification for the judge to encroach on the

foreseeable until the number and frequency of crimes on the premises were greater than two at a
minimum); McClendon v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 272 S.E.2d 592, 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(relieving a bank of liability because there were no special circumstances which would have made
the criminal act foreseeable).
228. Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981). In Daily, the court
found that § 344 was not meant to limit the duty of business owners to only those acts of third
persons which "are occurring or about to occur," but rather the business owner has a duty to protect
against acts which are foreseeable in light of past criminal acts. Id. at 474.
229. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 cmt. f. Comment f states a business invitor's duty
to police the premises arises when,
he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are
about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience,
that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is
likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on
the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his
past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct
on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be
under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient
number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Id.
230. Daily, 458 N.E.2d at 475-76 (stating that the existence of prior criminal activity on the
business invitor's premises makes it possible for the invitor to anticipate subsequent criminal
attacks). Moreover, if the prior incidents are uniquely within the knowledge of the premises owner,
such that the invitee would have no reason to know of the danger, the business owner's duty to the
invitee will be greater.
231. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 235 (discussing that determinations of liability are mixed
questions of law and fact); RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 328B cmt. b (stating that the functions
of the judge and the jury are interdependent); Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact,
72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924) (stating that although it is generally said that the judge and jury
have separate functions, in reality, these functions overlap).
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function of the jury. In a negligence action, the court determines the questions
of law and the jury determines the questions of fact. 32 Usually, determining
whether a duty exists is a question of law and is decided by the court. 3 The
court's determination of whether a bank had a duty to protect an ATM customer
against the conduct of third persons will depend upon whether the bank could
foresee or had notice of the potential conduct.'
The fact that the bank-ATM
customer relationship qualifies as a special relationship' places a minimal
duty upon the bank to exercise reasonable care to protect the ATM customer
against an unreasonable risk of harm.?
Whether this minimal duty includes
protecting against third party crime will depend
upon whether the surrounding
23 7
circumstances made such crime foreseeable.

232. See HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 342. Though the judge decides questions of law and
the jury decides questions of fact, the law of negligence commingles the two functions. Id.
Henderson states that the division of functions is "in no way dictated by the meaning inheient in the
terms law and fact." Id. Rather, Henderson holds that a determination of negligence is not a
question of law or fact but is an application of law to fact. Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 16,
at 164-65, 235-37 (stating that the judge determines the legal issues and the jury the factual issues).
However, Prosser notes that in reality, these determinations are not discretely separable because each
determination may involve questions of law and fact thus overlapping the determinations of the
other. Id.
233. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 236; HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 342. The determination
of whether a duty exists is a role specifically designated to the judge. Id.; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 13, § 328B(b) and cmt. c. In § 328B, the Restatement sets out the functions of the court as
determining whether a dispute of fact exists based on the evidence presented, whether the facts
presented create a legal duty on the part of the defendant, the general standard of conduct resulting
from the legal duty, the rules of law applicable to the question of causation of the plaintiff's harm,
and whether the plaintiff's harm is legally compensable. Id. § 328B.
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. e (stating that a business invitor has
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against a sudden attack from a third person
when he knows or should know of the unreasonable risk of the attack); Stalzer v. European Am.
Bank, 113 Misc. 2d 77, 83 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (stating that "[it is now well established that the
duty owed is one of reasonable care under the circumstances whereby foreseeability shall be a
measure of liability"); see also Butler v. Acme Mkts. Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1143 (N.J. 1982)
(finding that foreseeability of the risk of criminal conduct is crucial in determining duty); Brocks v.
Watts Realty Co., 582 So. 2d 438, 440 (Ala. 1991) (stating that businesses are liable for criminal
acts of third persons when such acts are reasonably foreseeable); Comastro v. Village of Rosemont,
461 N.E.2d 616, 620 (iII. App. Ct. 1989) (stating the extent to which a business invitor must protect
the invitee against harm depends upon whether the harm could be foreseen).
235. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 314A (articulating special relationships which give rise
to a duty to protect). The bank-ATM customer relationship is that of business invitor-invitee which
is recognized by the Restatement as a special relationship. Id.
236. Id. § 314A. Comment e adds that "the duty in each case is only [a duty] to exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances." Id. § 314A cmt. e.
237. Id. (stating that the invitor will not be liable to protect another if he does not know or have
notice of the potential for harm to the invitee); id. § 314A cmt. f (stating that a defendant is not
required to take any action to protect the plaintiff from harm by third parties until the defendant
knows or has reason to know that the plaintiff is endangered). Comment f specifically states that
the defendant's duty is determined by the circumstances of the situation. Id. See also Balard v.
Bassman Event Sec., Inc., 258 Cal. Rptr. 343, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that just because
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When the circumstances establish that the likelihood of an ATM crime was
foreseeable, the bank's minimal duty would include protecting ATM patrons
against the actions of third parties.'
Likewise, when the ATM crime was not
foreseeable, then the bank's minimal duty would not include protecting patrons
against third parties. Determining whether the ATM crime was foreseeable
requires evaluating the circumstances surrounding the crime. 9 Evidence of
a bank's past experience may establish that the bank had notice of the likelihood
of future crime.'
Thus, evidence of prior criminal incidents on or near the
bank's premises may establish notice."
The jury should determine whether
evidence of prior related criminal incidents establishes notice, because this
determination involves fact finding. 2 The jury should determine the factual
questions such as whether the incidents were substantially similar, whether the
prior incidents were close enough in proximity to the bank, or whether thefrequency of past incidents was high enough to make the instant ATM crime

a duty may exist, the duty may not necessarily be imposed in all situations but rather should be
determined on a case-by-case basis).
238. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 314A cmt. e. Also, § 344 specifies that a business
invitor is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect invitees when the potential for harm
is known or when the business invitor should have known of the potential for harm. Id. § 344.
Further, § 344 of the Restatement states that a business invitor is subject to liability for dangerous
conditions to his invitees when he or she knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover
such conditon, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee. Id.
§ 343.
239. See Stalzer v. European Am. Bank, 113 Misc. 2d 77, 84 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (stating
that a bank's duty to protect an invitee will depend upon the various circumstances and factors
present).
240. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 cmt. f; see supra note 224; Daily v. K-Mart, 458
N.E.2d 471, 475-76 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981). Furthermore, a business invitor has a duty to discover
past criminal conduct on or near his surroundings. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 182. Prosser
states that a defendant's knowledge of his surroundings is critical to establishing notice and
negligence. Id. The defendant is required to be aware of his surroundings and to discover that
which a reasonable person in the same situation would consider necessary. Id. In addition, Prosser
explains that as a result of the special relationship between a business invitor and a business invitee,
the business invitor is under a duty to investigate or discover dangerous conditions and may be liable
for remaining ignorant. Id. at 185.
See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 302B (stating that a failure to act may be negligence
if the defendant knew or should have known that an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff
existed, even if the harm was criminal conduct caused by a third party).
241. Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 475-76 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981) (stating that
existence of prior criminal activity shows that future crime may be foreseeable and creates a question
for the jury); Morgan v. Bucks, 428 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (stating that the evidence
of prior occurrences of rowdiness on the premises were sufficient to establish a jury question as to
notice); Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1146 (N.J. 1982) (finding that whether a
history of repeated attacks on the premises was sufficient to require the premises owner to increase
security was a question for the jury).
242. lannelli v. Powers, 498 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (stating that "[t]he
question of what safety precautions may reasonably be required of the possessor of realty is
generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury").
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These factual determinations will establish whether the ATM
foreseeable.'
crime was or was not foreseeable and should be made before the judge rules on
a bank's duty.'
For this reason, when courts grant summary judgment or motions to
dismiss in favor of a bank, after evidence of prior related incidents has been
presented, the court encroaches upon the jury's determination of
Although in certain instances, the judge may find that the
foreseeability.'
ATM crime was foreseeable. Such judicial discretion should only be exercised
upon the determination that reasonable minds clearly could not differ on whether

243. Morgan v. Bucks, 428 F. Supp. 546, 549-50 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (stating that the prior acts
committed by third persona on the business owner's premises were evidence enough for the jury to
determine that the defendant knew or had reason to know of a likelihood of danger to the invitee).
244. RESTATEMENT, supranote 13, § 328B cmt. c. When the determination of an issue of law,
such as duty, is dependant upon a particular issue of fact, "it is the function of the court to rule upon
the particular issue, and to apply its ruling in the form of an instruction to the jury." Id. When a
dispute of fact exists, the court must direct the jury accordingly as to the defendant's duty or absence
of duty, depending upon the jury's resolution of the dispute of fact. Id. § 328B cmt. e. The jury
does not decide the legal question of duty but rather decides the dispute of fact upon which the duty
is contingent. Id.
245. See Daily v. K-Mart Corp., 458 N.E.2d 471, 475 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1981). In Daily, the
court found that evidence of prior criminal incidents allowed the plaintiffs to avoid summary
judgment and created a jury question as to whether the business owner acted reasonably. Id. at 47576. The court stated that, in light of her knowledge of prior criminal incidents, the jury must
determine whether the business owner took reasonable steps to secure the premises. Id. See also
PRossER, supra note 16, at 236 (stating that if reasonable persons may differ as to whether a fact
such as notice exists, the conclusion must be drawn by the jury).
Thus, the narrow approaches err by holding that a bank, or business invitor, has no duty
without allowing the jury to evaluate the affect of the prior incidents on the issue of notice. E.g.,
Gray v. McDonald's Corp., 874 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (granting a restaurant
owner's motion to dismiss despite evidence of prior criminal activity on and around the premises);
Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 859-60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the trial court did
not err in granting a restaurant owner's motion to dismiss despite evidence that the third party
assailant had frequently generated dangerous conditions at the restaurant in the past); McCoy v. Gay,
302 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a defendant-hotel owner did not have a duty to
protect the plaintiff-invitee despite the plaintiff's evidence of prior similar incidents on the premises);
Brown v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In Brown, the
trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of a store owner despite evidence of 16 prior
robberies and seven prior strong arm robberies on the store's premises. Id.
Following the narrow approaches of other courts, the courts analyzing a bank's duty in ATM
cases have encroached on the jury's role by not allowing the jury to consider evidence of prior
incidents. E.g., Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 134, 140 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint despite evidence of prior similar incidents at banks
near the defendant's, five prior incidents at the defendant's bank, complaints from another customer
who was shot at the defendant's bank, and safety warnings from local authorities); Williams v. First
Ala. Bank, 545 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1989) (granting summary judgment for the bank despite
evidence of two prior robberies at the bank branch in the same year as the plaintiff's attack).
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In all other
the evidence did or did not make future crime foreseeable.'
instances, the jury should make this determination. 7 By ruling that a bank
had no duty to protect the ATM patron when there is evidence of prior related
criminal incidents, the judge improperly decides as a matter of law the questions
of fact which are designated for the jury's consideration. In addition to
conflicting with these basic tort principles, the narrower approaches also conflict
with basic principles of social policy.
C. The Narrow Approaches are Contraryto Public Policy
4
A narrow analysis of foreseeability and duty contradicts public policy.2
First, a narrow interpretation of foreseeability permits each bank to escape
liability for the first ATM crime which occurs. 9 Refusing to allow the first
plaintiff to recover due to the lack of prior similar crimes," or due to the
absence of an extensive history of prior incidents at the exact location,:s
results in an unjust system of compensation. Under this view of foreseeability,
the first victim always loses, while subsequent victims may recover. Broadening
the current approach to recognize that prior criminal activity near the bank's
premises may establish foreseeability and, ultimately, duty, will encourage banks

246. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 436-48 (1985); PROSSER, supra note
16, at 236 (stating that "if the evidence is such that no reasonably intelligent person would accept
it as sufficient to establish the existence of a fact essential to negligence, it becomes the duty of the
court to remove the issue from the jury" and grant a judgment as a matter of law).
247. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 246, at 439-40 (1985). A motion for summary judgment
is appropriate when the court finds that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id. at 439. The
party moving for summary judgment has the burden to present all information bearing upon that
issue and clearly establish that no factual dispute exists regarding that matter. Id. All inferences
and conclusions regarding the existence of a fact, such as whether the facts establish lack of
knowledge, should be resolved against the party seeking summary judgment and the issue should
be decided by the jury. Id. at 439-40. Thus, when a dispute of fact exists, the motion for summary
judgment should be denied. Id. See also Daily, 458 N.E.2d at 476. In Daily, the court was
considering a motion for summary judgment and held that the plaintiffs' presentation of prior
criminal incidents allowed the plaintiffs to avoid the business owner's summary judgment motion.
Id. The court reasoned that when considering the summary judgment motion, the evidence of prior
criminal incidents was enough for the court to find that reasonable minds could differ as to what was
reasonably foreseeable and thus a question of fact for the jury existed. Id. The court reasoned that
the evidence of prior criminal incidents must be presented to the jury for a determination of the
reasonableness of the business owner's security at the time the plaintiffs were attacked. Id.
248. Isaacs v. Huntington Mem. Hoasp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985) (finding that the approach
to duty which only recognizes a duty when prior crimes fit the substantial similarity requirements
is contrary to public policy).
249. Id. at 658 (stating that "a landowner should not get one free assault before he can be held
liable for criminal acts which occur on his property"); Shea v. Preservation Chicago, Inc., 565
N.E.2d 20, 25 (Il. App. Ct. 1990). See also Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 905 (criticizing the strict
views of prior incidents for denial of compensation to the first victim).
250. See supra notes 128-33, 182-86 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 119-27, 193-200 and accompanying text.
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to improve their security measures before the first ATM patron becomes a
victim of crime.
However, broadening the approach too far, like the totality of the
circumstances approach, would place liability on banks based on nationwide
crime statistics. An approach which recognizes that prior related incidents may
establish foreseeability strikes the best balance between the narrow view of
foreseeability under the no-duty and special circumstances approaches versus the
overexpansive view under the totality of the circumstances approach. By
allowing the jury to consider prior related incidents, the first ATM victim would
be able to withstand summary judgment when there was evidence of criminal
incidents on surrounding property or at nearby banks. However, by limiting the
evidence to related incidents, plaintiffs would not be able to bring claims based
solely on general ATM crime statistics.
In addition, a narrow approach to foreseeability and duty frustrates the
public policy of preventing future harm. 2 If banks are allowed to wait until
the frequency of criminal attacks increases before a duty is recognized, banks
will have no incentive to provide adequate security measures, even when a bank
knows dangerous conditions exist. 3 Moreover, when there is a history of
criminal activity on the premises, the bank, rather than the ATM patron, is in

252. Isaacs v. Huntington Mem. Hosp., 695 P.2d at 658. A narrow view of a business owner's
duty, which does not require business owners to prevent criminal attacks on their premises, has the
effect of relieving business owners of their role in reducing the crime in society in general. See
generally Baylzer, supra note 13, at 730, 750. In order for society to reduce crime, business owners
must take steps to prevent crime. Id. The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Community Crime Prevention Committee has concluded that in order for law
enforcement to achieve its goal of crime reduction, citizens must care enough to get involved in the
fight against crime. Id. at 730 n.14, 750 n.151. Bayzler argues that in order for the goal of
reducing crime to materialize, private businesses must get involved since they hold the economic
power in our nation. Id. at 750 n.151. By involving those citizens with the greatest amount of
economic power and influence, the greatest reduction in crime will be produced. Id.
253. Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 445 A.2d 1141 (N.J. 1982) ("The proprietor of premises to
which the public is invited for business purposes of the proprietor. . . owes a duty of reasonable
care to those who enter the premises upon that invitation to provide a reasonably safe place to do
that which is within the scope of the invitation."); Kevin J. O'Donnell, Comment, LandlordLiability
for Crime to Florida Tenants - The New Duty to ProtectFrom ForeseeableAttack, 11 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 979, 985 (1984) (discussing that by imposing liability, courts would provide an economic
incentive for landowners to upgrade security); see also Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 904-05
(discussing that a duty limited to special circumstances discourages property owners from
investigating potential dangers and from implementing security measures because under the narrow
theory of duty, the premise owner will escape liability as long as he or she remains ignorant of
criminal activity).
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the best position to protect against future crime.?
It is not unfair to require
banks, who invite the public onto the premises for the bank's benefit, to ensure
that the areas of invitation are safe, particularly when a history of persistent
attacks exists. 5
Typically, occurrence of prior criminal incidents is
Therefore,
information uniquely within the premises owner's knowledge.'
when a bank has the ability to control the security of the premises, the duty
should fall on the bank to protect the unsuspecting ATM customer. 7
Furthermore, requiring plaintiffs to meet an unattainably high standard of
foreseeability, such as requiring prior criminal incidents to be exactly like the
present crime or requiring proof that the bank knew the identity of the assailant
and the location of the crime, creates such high standards that plaintiffs cannot
withstand a bank's motion for summary judgment.'
This obstacle for ATM
plaintiffs directly conflicts with the policy notions of corrective justice that
underlie tort principles.s
The current narrow approach to foreseeability

254. Butler, 445 A.2d at 1147 (N.J. 1982) (holding that "the business invitor is in the best
position to provide either warnings or adequate protection for its patrons when the risk of injury is
prevalent under certain conditions, and because the public interest lies in providing a reasonably safe
place for a patron to shop"); Winn v. Holmes, 299 P.2d 994, 995 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (stating that
a premises owner's duty to protect invitees from harm is justified based on the fact that the owner
usually has superior knowledge of an existing danger of which his invitees are unaware).
255. Butler, 445 A.2d at 1143 (referring to the appellate court's opinion of the case at 426 A.2d
521 (citations omitted)); Socha v. Passino, 306 N.W.2d 316-18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that
a business invitee confers a benefit upon the invitor, thus a rigorous duty is placed on the invitor in
exchange for the benefit conferred); PROSSER, supra note 16, at 420 (stating that an invitor may have
an affirmative duty of care as a result of the economic benefit the invitor derives from the invitee).
256. See Zacharias, supra note 18, at 702-03 (stating that business invitors, rather than the
invitees, have superior knowledge of specific dangers on or near their premises).
257. See Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 901-02, 910 (suggesting a number of options which
premises owners could implement to reduce or prevent criminal activity on their property); see
generally Kulwicki, supra note 13, at 262-65 (discussing the policy reasons in favor of placing the
burden of providing adequate security to protect invitees).
258. See Williams v. First Ala. Bank, 545 So.2d 26 (Ala. 1989) (granting the defendant bank's
summary judgment motion when the plaintiff presented evidence of two prior criminal acts on the
premises); Page v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 850 S.W.2d 133, 140 CTenn. Ct. App. 1991)
(dismissing the ATM crime victim's complaint finding the bank had no duty when the assailant could
not be identified before the act); Dyer v. Norstar Bank, N.A., 588 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992), cert. denied, 610 N.E.2d 390 (N.Y. 1993) (granting the bank's summary judgment motion
because the court held that the bank had no duty to protect the plaintiff); Popp v. Cash Station, Inc,
613 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (dismissing the plaintiff's complaint on the theory that
the bank must be able to "identify precisely when or where such an attack may occur"); see supra
notes 175-209 and accompanying text.
259. DOUGLAS LAycocK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 17 (1994) (stating that the basis for
compensatory damages in tort cases is the traditional corrective justice argument that a plaintiff
should be restored to his rightful position); see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Care One Owes One's
Neighbors: CorrectiveJustice, 77 IOwA L. REV. 403, 409 (1992) (stating that tort victims should
be restored because the wrongdoer is unjustly enriched and has gained what the victim has lost).
The notion that tort victims deserve compensation stems back to early legal scholars such as
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thwarts the policy that tort victims should not be left uncompensated for injuries
caused by the wrongs of others.'
The purpose of tort law is to compensate individuals injured by another's
wrongful conduct." l By compensating plaintiffs, society returns injured
plaintiffs to their rightful position, from which they have been removed by the
defendants' failure to meet the required standard of care.'
Thus, basic tort
principles support using a broader approach to assess a bank's duty in ATM
crime cases. The prior related incidents approach would provide an attainable
standard of foreseeability to ATM crime victims. Since a duty on banks to
provide adequate protection against ATM crimes would be more readily
recognized, banks would be encouraged to maintain adequate security.
Finally, the unique characteristics of the bank-ATM customer relationship
justifies placing a higher degree of responsibility on the banking industry. The

Aristotle. Id. at 403. Based on Aristotle's account, corrective justice achieves fairness and equality
by correcting the disturbance of natural equality caused by the defendant's wrongful infringement
of the plaintiff's rights. Id. at 404. In addition, the need to compensate tort victims is supported
by economists such as Richard Posner. LAYCOCK, supra, at 17. Posner advocates that by
compensating victims, society encourages profitable activity by forcing law violators to take account
of the harm they inflict, thereby as the liability increases the number of potential defendants will
decrease. Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 at 191 (4th ed.
1992)).
260. LAYCOCK, supra note 259, at 17.
261. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 6 (citing Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Tons,
8 CAMPBE. L. REv. 238 (1944)). Prosser states that "the common thread woven into all torts is
the idea of unreasonable interference with the interests of others" thus society seeks to compensate
the victim as well as to discourage the socially harmful activity. Id. at 6-7; Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 30 (1972) (stating that "the ... purpose of civil liability
for negligence is to compensate the victim. . .).
Compare George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537,
550 (1972). Fletcher presents a helpful analysis of a tort victims right to recovery. Id. Fletcher
assesses the defendant's liability according to a fairness principle. Id. Under this analysis, the
plaintiff should recover when the defendant's conduct subjects the plaintiff to more than his or her
fair share of "background risks." Id. Fletcher states that background risks are the risks which each
individual in society must bear without compensation. Id.; see generally Vern R. Walker, The
Concept of Baseline Risk in Tort Litigation, 80 KY. L.J. 631, 633-34 (1992) (discussing how
"normal risks," those inherent in everday life, should be determined). However, Fletcher argues
that when one individual suffers harm from risk over and above the background risks, the person
is entitled to compensation. Fletcher, supra, at 550. Fletcher argues that each person in society has
the right to security from the risk of harm. Id. Using John Rawls' principle of justice, Fletcher
finds that each person has a right to an equal portion of this security and that within this amount,
each individual deserves the maximum amount of security from the risk. Id. Therefore, tort victims
are entitled to compensation when there is a disproportionate distribution of the risk of harm such
that the victim has been subjected to a greater portion of risk than the rest of society. Id. at 550-51.
262. LAYCOcK, supra note 259, at 17; see PROSSER, supra note 16, at 236-37 (discussing the
standard of care).
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public's unique perception of banks justifies requiring banks to exercise a greater
degree of care than that of ordinary business invitors.'
Due to the purpose
and character of a bank, overseeing the public's transactions of money and
providing for the safekeeping of the public's money, the public has a perception
of trust and respect for a bank which differs from any other store or commercial
premises.'
Therefore, bank customers, including ATM customers, generally
assume that when they are on bank premises to transact business they are
present in a safe and secure environment.'
In addition, the circumstances surrounding an ATM transaction often make
crime particularly foreseeable.'
The function of the ATM itself, to serve
bank customers after hours, exposes ATM customers to an increased risk of
criminal attack.'
The fact that ATM crimes occur after normal banking
hours when no other individuals are present, increases the likelihood that ATM
patrons will be the victim of a third party crime.'
These unique circumstances generate a need to encourage banks to increase
security measures to protect ATM patrons. Broadening the current approach to
a bank's duty would give banks the needed incentive to improve precautionary
measures at ATMs, before ATM crimes become more frequent.'
Recognizing that prior incidents on or near a bank's premises may result in a
duty to protect patrons from third party attacks would encourage prophylactic
measures as well as provide tort victims with the potential to redress their

263. Stalzer v. European American Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634-35 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982)
(finding that a bank's relationship with the public is different than the public's relationship with
ordinary businesses, thus the bank is subject to a higher standard than that applied to ordinary
commercial affairs).
264. Id. at 634 (stating that as a result of a bank's trustworthy public image, a bank should be
held to a standard in compliance with this image).
265. Id. See also PRossER, supra note 16, at 422. Placing a higher duty on a bank is also
justified because of the implied representation of safety that exists. Id. Prosser discusses that
placing a duty to protect on business invitors is justified based on a theory of implied
representation. Id. When a business invitor, such as a bank, encourages others to enter the
premises for the invitor's benefit, an implied assurance exists that the invitor has prepared the
premises so that it is safe for those who enter for business purposes. Id. (citing to Treadway v.
Ebert Motor Co., 436 A.2d 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)).
The fact that the premises are held open to an invitee offers assurance to the invitee that the
premises have been secured for his or her reception. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 343A cmt.
g.
266. See supra notes 57-67 (discussing the features of an ATM and parking lot which are
attractive to crime).
267. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
268. BAI, supra note 10, at 38 (stating that the majority of ATM crimes occur between the
evening hours of seven and midnight).
269. See Posner, supra note 261, at 40 (stating that increasing the liability of defendants-as a
class will encourage the class to take more safety precautions than if the class is never liable).
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losses. In addition, a broader approach, under which the jury evaluates evidence
of prior related incidents, would properly allocate the functions of judge and
jury.
Under the proposed approach, a bank's duty would depend upon the
foreseeability of the ATM crime. When the jury finds that the crime was not
foreseeable, the bank would not have a duty to protect ATM patrons from third
party crime. However, when foreseeability is established, a duty to protect is
imposed. Even when a duty is found, liability would not be imposed until the
jury assesses the individual interests involved through a balancing test. The
balancing test would allow each ATM crime to be weighed according to its
unique circumstances.
VI.

PROPOSED TREATMENT OF

ATM CRIME CASES

This Note advocates that courts should broaden the current approach used
to analyze ATM crime cases. Rather than finding that banks have no-duty or
only have a duty under special circumstances, courts should recognize that
evidence of prior incidents related to the bank's premises may establish
foreseeability of the present crime. The court should allow the jury to
determine if the prior incidents establish foreseeability before the court
determines the bank's duty. If the jury finds that the facts establish notice, the
court should rule that a duty exists.
If a duty is found, the bank will not automatically be liable. Liability will
depend upon the jury's determination of negligence. To evaluate a bank's
liability, the jury should use a flexible balancing test which will balance the
competing interest and take into account the unique facts of the case, thus
allowing for a bank's ultimate liability for ATM crimes to be determined on a
case-by-case basis. The following model demonstrates how a court and a jury
should analyze an ATM case under a prior related incidents approach.
A. Determining a Bank's Duty
Based on the Restatement of Torts and existing case authority, 2 a court
should find that a bank has a duty to protect an ATM customer against criminal
attack by third parties when such an attack is foreseeable."I When evidence
of prior related criminal activity exists, whether the bank had notice becomes a

270. See supra notes 151, 222-30 and accompanying text.
271. See generally supra section Ill.B.3.
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factual issue for the jury to resolve before the court rules on a bank's duty.'
Through proper limiting instructions or through a special interrogatory, the court
should direct the jury to evaluate the effect of the prior related incidents on the
bank's ability to foresee ATM crime. The jury should be instructed to
determine all factual questions bearing on foreseeability such as whether the
prior incidents were close enough to the bank's premises to establish
foreseeability or whether the nature of the prior incidents made the present
crime foreseeable. If the jury finds that the prior related incidents did not make
the present ATM crime foreseeable, the bank would not have a duty to protect
the ATM patron against third party attack. In the alternative, if the jury
determines that the incidents made the present ATM crime foreseeable, the bank
would have a duty to protect the ATM patron.
B. Determining a Bank's Liability
If a duty is found to exist, the jury should continue its analysis and
determine whether the bank was negligent.'
The court should instruct the
jury that the general standard of conduct has been established as a matter of law,
and that the jury should define the particular standard. 4 In a negligence
action, the general standard of care is the care which a reasonable person would
exercise under like circumstances. " The jury should then define what
constitutes reasonable care under the particular circumstances and whether the
bank's conduct met this standard. 6 The court should explain to the jury that

272. The jury will determine the sufficiency of the evidence such as how close in proximity the
crimes need to be to the bank or how many prior incidents are necessary to create notice. See
generally infra section VI.B.
273. See supra note 29. The Restatement of Torts articulates negligence as
(a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, or
(b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of another
and which the actor is under a duty to do.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 284.
274. Prosser, supra note 16, at 235-37 (stating that after the judge determines that a duty exists,
the jury then fills in the details of the duty by defining what particular conduct is required to meet
the duty).
275. Posner, supra note 261, at 38 (stating that the standard of care used to judge a defendant's
conduct in a negligence action is that of an ordinary prudent man); RESTATEMENT, supra note 13,
§ 344 cmt. d (stating that "[a] possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes" has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect such visitors).
276. PRossER, supra note 16, at 236; RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 328C. The Restatement
articulates the functions of the jury. Id. The judge first declares the general standard of the
defendant's legal duty to the jury in the form of an instruction. Id. § 328C cmt. b. The jury then
fills in the broad general standard with the details of the particular standard. Id. Thus, in a
negligence case, the judge articulates the general standard of conduct to be that of a reasonable man
under like circumstances. Id. The jury then determines what the general standard of conduct
requires in the case at hand, so as "to set a particular standard of its own within the general one."
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the bank's conduct should be evaluated by balancing the potential burden of
imposing a duty on the bank against the likelihood of the occurrence of an ATM
crime and the gravity of the resulting harm.'
The judge should instruct the
Id. The jury's determination is said to be a determination of fact rather than of law, meaning that
the determination is not a set rule, so that the outcome will be determined on a unique case-by-case
basis. Id. See Cohen v. Southland Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that the adequacy of a business invitor's security measures to protect invitees from assault or
threatening behavior by third parties is a question of fact for the jury to determine).
In most instances, the standard set by the judge is a very general standard. HENDERSON,
supra note 14, at 342. As a result, notwithstanding the court's limiting instructions, the jury has
great freedom in assessing the negligence issue. Id. Henderson proposes that "it is only a slight
exaggeration to assert that negligence in most cases is whatever the jury says it is." Id. Thejury's
findings of fact will determine whether the defendant failed to meet the standard of care set by the
judge, that is, whether the defendant was negligent. Id. Negligence is labeled a question of fact,
because "it is believed to be appropriate for the jury to play an important role in applying law to fact
in these cases." Id.
A benefit of having a jury, rather than a judge, consider factual issues such as the sufficiency
of safety measures, is that the jury brings their broad experiences and judgment as representatives
of the community. Posner, supra note 261, at 51. Posner finds that in many situations, the jury
will have a better understanding of the facts than a judge. Id. Posner states that the juries are more
representative of tortfeasors and tort vicitms than judges and thus have a "better feel for the facts."
Id. Entrusting the jurors with a large portion of the lawmaking function is necessary, because
evaluating whether the facts constitute negligence requires a lay judgment. Id. at 52. Posner argues
that the judgment required in negligence cases is that of individuals familiar with the various
experiences of everyday life. Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 16, at 237 (stating that the jury is
representative of the public and assesses the defendant's conduct according to what the community
would require under the circumstances). Thus, the jury determines what type of warnings and
precautions would have been sufficient to assure the safety of the injured plaintiff in the
circumstances of the case. Posner, supra note 261, at 52.
277. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (articulating Judge
Learned Hand's analysis of a person's duty to prevent injuries which balances the three factors of
gravity of the harm, the likelihood of the occurrence, and the burden on the defendant); lannelli v.
Powers, 498 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381-82 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (stating that a jury determines
reasonableness by "taking into account such factors as, ... the seriousness of the risk, the severity
of potential injuries and the cost or burden imposed on the possessor by reason of each such
precautionary measure."). Judge Hand states that a person's duty should be balanced in a formula
using: (1) the probability that a certain conduct will occur, (2) the gravity of the resulting harm,
if the conduct does occur; and (3) the burden of implementing adequate precautions to prevent the
conduct. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. Negligence is established when the burden of adequate
precautions, "B," is less than or equal to the gravity of the harm, "L," multiplied by the probability,
"P,": B < P x L. Id.; Posner, supra note 261, at 32 (supporting that Judge Learned Hand's
balancing of the costs and benefits is essential for analysis of the liability involved in a negligence
claim). Posner states that the jury applies Hand's formula to the facts within the limits of the
judge's instructions. Id.
Judge Hand's formula is consistently used to support the argument that "the purpose of tort
law is to maximize social utility: where the costs of accidents exceeds the costs of preventing them,
the law will impose liability."
Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va.
1981) (stating that "scholars in the field [of torts] rely on Judge Learned Hand's classic statement
of negligence .... ."); Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating
that "[t]he amount of care that a person ought to take is a function of the probability and magnitude
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jury to evaluate each one of these factors based on the specific facts of the
situation. The following model demonstrates how the circumstances weigh into
the balance.
On one side of the balancing test, the gravity of the harm and the likelihood
of its occurrence should be evaluated. To evaluate the gravity of the harm, the
seriousness of the ATM victim's injury as well as the seriousness of prior
incidents on or near the bank's premises will be significant. The gravity of the
harm involved in ATM crimes will vary in the degree of seriousness, ranging
from minor stabbings and assaults to murders and kidnappings.'
The more
serious the ATM victim's injury, the heavier this factor should weigh. When
a victim is the subject of a crime such as Douglas Lane's tragic killing,' or
the stabbing of the elderly man in New York,'8 the gravity of the harm will
weigh heavily in the balancing test. Likewise, as the seriousness of prior
incidents on a bank's premises increases, so should the weight given to the
gravity of the harm in the overall balancing test. In addition, the gravity of
prior incidents near the bank's premises or in the community should be included,
since crimes on neighboring property may put the bank on notice as to the
possibility of criminal conduct on the bank's premises. 28 ' However, any
general evidence, such as evidence of ATM crimes in another state, should be
given little weight in the balancing test.282 This limit would be necessary to
avoid holding banks in low crime areas to the same standard as banks in high
crime areas. m

of the harm that may occur if he does not take care."). The court reasoned that the probability and
magnitude of the harm correspond to the foreseeability factor which limits a defendant's liability in
negligence cases. Id. A defendant's assessment of the probability and magnitude of the potential
harm will determine the amount of care he exercises. Id. Thus, balancing the probability and
magnitude of the harm on a case-by-case basis is essential to evaluating a defendant's duty. Id.;
PROSSER, supra note 16, at 170-71 (discussing the balancing test between the risk of harm and the
likelihood of occurence versus the utility of the conduct); see also Fletcher, supra note 261, at 542
(presenting a formula for assessing a defendant's liability in a negligence case which resembles
Hand's balance).
278. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 150-72, 214-30 and accompanying text (stating that evidence regarding
the surrounding community is enough to create a jury question as to the defendant's notice).
282. General evidence, which is unrelated to the bank's premises, should not by itself be
sufficient to establish foreseeability. However, if a plaintiff also had evidence of prior incidents
related to the bank's premises, then the jury may consider the general evidence, since such evidence
could provide background knowledge to the jury. The judge should instruct the jury that alone, this
evidence is insufficient to support a finding of foreseeability.
283. For example, a bank in Wheatfield, Indiana would not be required to account for the crime
occurring at an ATM in Chicago, but would be accountable for crime at another ATM in
Wheatfield.
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In assessing the likelihood of ATM crime, the unique features of each ATM
location should be considered.'
Evaluation of the likelihood of occurrence
will be a critical part of the balancing test, since crime is often a function of
location. 8
ATMs located in empty parking lots or remote areas could
increase the likelihood of a criminal occurrence. Moreover, the surrounding
neighborhood and geographic location of the ATM should be evaluated in the
balancing test. A bank customer would be more likely to be the victim of an
ATM crime in Chicago than in Wheatfield, Indiana.'
Also, all evidence of
prior criminal incidents on the bank's premises would increase the likelihood of
future crime and should be given more weight in the balancing test.'
A
history of misconduct may lead a jury to conclude that a reasonable person
should exercise care to protect invitees against the actions of third parties.'
The volume of transactions at an ATM should also be considered in the
balancing test. The general likelihood of an ATM crime occurring has been
estimated to be one crime per 3.5 million ATM transactions.'
While this
number may appear relatively low, an ATM network which reports 300 million
transactions a year would report an average of eighty-six crimes a year.? As

284. See supra notes 41-60 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing the attractiveness of parking lots
to criminals); Lipman, supra note 8, at 24 (reporting that an ATM "provides an electronic
environment that is potentially fertile for criminal abuse"). Lipman states that the location of the
ATM in the parking lots exposes customers to a "heightened risk of assault of theft." Id.
286. For example, Los Angeles police report that there are six ATM robberies each day.
Gilbert H. Deitch, ATM Liability: Fast Cash, Fast Crime, UncertainLaw, Trial, Oct. 1994, 34, 36
(citing Josh Meyer, Safety Measures Questioned as ATM Robberies Increase, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
18, 1991, at A1). Whereas Robert Gierman reported that there have been no criminal incidents at
the ATM or on property near NBD's bank in Crown Point, Indiana. Gierman Interview, supra note
50.
287. See Cohen v. Southland, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (determining
that future robberies were more likely in light of the history of prior robberies on the defendant's
premises). The jury should consider the nature of these prior incidents as well. For instance, if the
plaintiff was the victim of an armed robbery at an ATM, prior armed robberies may make the
plaintiff's incident more likely than would a prior incident of loitering.
288. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 344 cmt. f (stating that past incidents may put an
invitor on notice as to the potential of future harm); see supra note 225 and accompanying text.
289. Deitch, supra note 286, at 36 (citing Barry Schreiber, The Future of ATM Security,
SECURITY MGMT., Mar. 1994, at 18A); Rob Wright, ATM have been Heraldedfor Ea y Delivery
of Services; Unfortunately, Thieves Find Them Just as Convenient, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 1988,
at 11; Barthel, supra note 67, at 10 (quoting an ATM expert to say that "a person's chances of being
robbed after or during an ATM transaction are small"). But see Jeffrey Kutler, BAI Survey Finds
ATM Crimes Don't Fit the Stereotype, AM. BANKER, May 11, 1987, at 19 (stating that in studying
corporate crimes, "researchers must also be wary of under-reporting by organizations fearful of
besmirching their public image").
290. Fioravante, supra note 52, at 17. Fioravante reported that in 1986, one network had 38
machines each averaging 67,000 transactions. Id. Thus, that network would have a total of 1.9
million transactions a year.
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ATM customers increase their use of ATMs, the opportunities for them to
become victims of an ATM crime increase proportionally. Thus, evidence that
a bank had vigorously advertised, implemented unique features, offered
customer bonuses, or used other techniques to spur customers to use an ATM
should increase the weight given to the likelihood of occurrence."
The gravity of the harm and the likelihood of occurrence should be weighed
against the bank's burden of increasing security measures to protect ATM
patrons.'
The burden will vary among banks since each ATM crime will be
different. For this reason, expert testimony on available security would provide
the jury with knowledge of the types of security measures'
and their
effectiveness in the circumstances. ' In addition, evidence showing the costs
of implementing security measures will be essential to a jury's evaluation of a
bank's burden. 5
The jury should consider the cost and feasibility of
implementing minimal security measures such as additional lighting, reflective

291. PRossER, supra note 16, at 419-20 (stating that advertising and encouraging customers to
come serves to generate a duty on a business invitor); see also supra notes 47-56 and accompanying
text.
292. At present, protective measures are installed primarily to protect the bank itself from ATM
theft, rather than to protect the ATM customer. Gierman Interview, supra note 50 (stating that
when a new ATM is installed, the bank's main concern is securing the ATM from theft rather than
providing security for the ATM customer). See also BAI, supra note 10, at 41 (reporting that
historically, ATM site selection was primarily "a marketing decision"). BAI reports that in the past,
banks typically chose sites which increased market penetration, customer convenience, customeruse,
and banking services. Id. However, state statutes now place regulations on the sites of new ATMs.
See supra notes 71-80.
293. See BAI, supra note 10, at 37. BAI reported in 1988 that the available security measures
used by banks and their rate of use included: locked cash canisters, written ATM security standards,
law enforcement liaison regarding ATM-related crimes, transaction cameras, security enclosures at
off-premises ATMs, surveillance cameras, periodic customer ATM security education, and customer
activated emergency alarms. Id. See also Zacharias, supra note 18, at 747 n.256 (stating that the
range of security measures includes warnings to customers, providing surveillance cameras,
installing bullet proof glass, providing emergency phones, and hiring security guards).
294. See Yelnosky, supra note 13, at 902 (stating that "court[s] should recognize, or at least
admit evidence tending to show, that security measures, if properly implemented, can reduce
criminal activity by eliminating criminal opportunity"); Zacharias, supra note 18, at 747 n.256
(stating that security cameras deter robbers).
295. But see Miles, supra note 7, at 208-09, reporting that in the past, servicing fees were
thought to be the result of requiring banks to assume a burden to implement security at ATMs.
However, the fact that banks are levying various transaction fees as a means of increasing revenues
weakens this argument. See Barthel, supra note 53, at I (discussing the use of fees in the banking
industry); Heady, supra note 56, at 11. Furthermore, even if banks did pass on the burden to the
customer in the form of raised fees, customers would likely be willing to pay a few cents more for
added security. See Cohen v. Southland, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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mirrors, and video cameras. '9 In some circumstances, the jury may find that
security devices other than these minimal measures are necessary, such as in
downtown Chicago, where additional measures such as glass enclosures or
locking devices on ATM entrances may be needed to adequately protect ATM
customers.'
Though locking devices on doors are inexpensive,'
glass
enclosures are expensive and may overburden smaller banks.'
However, in
spite of the expense, the jury may find that the burden of implementing a glass
enclosure is outweighed by the gravity of the harm and likelihood of occurrence.
In evaluating the potential burden to a bank, the jury should also consider
the off-setting benefits which the bank derives from the ATM. The benefits a
bank derives will affect the potential burden on a bank as well as reflect upon
the bank's willingness to bear the burden.'
Much of the derived benefits are
economic in nature."° For example, banks profit from service fees charged

296. Gierman reports that these minimal security measures are inexpensive to implement.
Gierman Interview, supra note 50. A number of these minimal security measures are now mandated
by state statute. See supra notes 71-80.
In addition to measures which physically secure the ATM, the jury should consider the burden
of alternative precautionary measures such as warnings. The burden of requiring banks to mail
safety precautions, such as a one time safety instruction to the ATM user, would weigh little because
banks already mail monthly statements and additional information to their customers. Gierman
Interview, supra.
297. See supra note 77 (showing that the requirements of the New York Administrative Code
require enclosured ATMs and locking devices on the enclosures at all New York City ATMs).
However, failure to have such security measures is not negligence per se and only results in a fine
to the bank. Id.
298. Gierman Interview, supra note 50.
299. Enclosing a free standing ATM can cost a bank as much as 50,000 to 70,000 dollars. Id.
300. The profit a bank derives from an ATM will affect the extent of the burden to the bank,
because the the cost of implementing security measures will be related to the benefit derived from
the ATM. Theoretically, implementing costly security devices would be a greater burden to a bank
which derives a meager income from the ATM than to a bank which derives a substantial income
from an ATM. If a bank profited $500,000 a year from ATM business, asking the bank to
implement $15,000 in safety measures would not pose the same burden as requiring a bank which
profits only $50,000 a year from an ATM to bear the same cost. Thus, banks gaining a large profit
from ATMs should be better suited financially to bear the cost of protecting the patrons from whom
the benefit is derived.
301. The banking industry is deriving considerable profit from ATMs. See Miles, supra note
7, at 171 n.2. Past statistics show that in 1981, the cost of transacting an electronic deposit was
seven cents as compared to 59 cents for a check deposited by mail. Id.
A human teller can handle up to 200 transactions a day, works 30 hours a week, gets a salary
anywhere from $8,900 to $20,000 a year, plus fringe benefits, gets coffee breaks, a vacation and
sick time.
In contrast, an automated teller machine can handle 2,000 transactions a day, works 168 hours
a week, costs about $22,000 a year to run, and does not take coffee breaks or vacations. Except
for occasional breakdowns, it does not get sick. Id. (quoting N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1983, at D6).
ATMs draw additional customers and depositers to banks thereby increasing the bank's profits. Id.
Miles reports that after Citicorp installed an ATM, its profits increased due to the fact that Citicorp's
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for a customer's use of another bank's ATM or for overdrafts.'
The amount
of income derived and benefit gained from an ATM will vary among banks, 3
therefore varying the resulting burden on each bank. Banks also benefit by being
able to conduct business twenty-four hours a day without the expense of
remaining open.'
Thus, the burden and off-setting benefits of each case
should be evaluated in the balancing test.
In assessing the burden to banks, the social utility of the ATM should also
be evaluated.'
A concern of imposing a duty to protect against third party
crime is whether the resulting burden will cause the demise of socially useful or
necessary conduct.'
When an activity is of great social value, society will7
tolerate a greater risk of harm in order to retain the benefits of the activity .
The social benefit of the ATM service is mainly convenience to bank
customers.'
The jury may find that mere convenience is not enough to

share of deposits in the New York metropolitan area rose from 4.4% in 1977 to 9.6% in June, 1982.
Id. See also PROSSER, supra note 16, at 420 (stating that a pecuniary benefit to the possessor of
land serves to generate a duty on a possessor of land).
302. Gierman Interview, supra note 50. Mr. Gierman stated that the profit from a branch site
was generally less than from an off-site ATM. The large number of foreign customers using off-site
ATMs generates large profits for the bank due to transaction fees. Id. However, this profit is
reduced due to dataline costs and servicing costs of paying a third party to maintain the ATM. Id.
303. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
304. Fioravante, supra note 52, at 17 (stating that ATMs may not be as profitable for banks
which run off a mainframe and require a third party to service). But see Gierman Interview, supra
note 50 (stating that the expected economic benefit of decreasing bank personnel has not materialized
for NBD's banks). Mr. Gierman also stated that the primary benefits of ATMs in smaller, rural
towns were derived by the customer in convenience, rather than by the bank. Id.
305. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 170-71 (stating that the social value of the conduct in question
is a key factor in the balancing test). Negligence is established when the defendant's actions create
an unreasonable risk of harm that society is unwilling to tolerate in light of the benefits gained from
the activity. HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 319.
306. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 170-71.
307. Id. at 171. Prosser explains that society will tolerate certain dangerous conduct if the
social value of the conduct is great. Id. When the public interest in the defendant's conduct is very
low, there will be little justification for permitting dangerous conduct. Id. Customers as well as
banks are showing that they can afford to go without the convenience of twenty-four hour banking.
See Huang, supra note 8, at 7 (quoting one ATM customer as saying that he would not go to an
ATM anymore due to the reports of robberies and assaults); see also Karen Gullo, Banks Limiting
Hours at A7Ms, citing POST-TRIB., Oct. 29, 1994, at B4 (reporting that in light of safety
considerations, some banks have started restricting hours; however, the number of these banks doing
so is less than 1%of the country's 95,000 ATMs); See Wright, supra note 289, at 11 (reporting that
some banks are closing ATMs in high crime districts at night).
308. Gierman Interview, supra note 50. See also Deitch, supra note 286, at 34 (stating that
bank customers want the instant gratification of twenty-four hour access to bank accounts); Lipman,
supra note 8, at 24 (reporting that banks hope to increase the convenience of ATMs by selling
theater tickets and lottery tickets); Miles, supra note 7, at 171 (stating that ATMs have brought
considerable convenience to bank customers).
Included in the convenience of the ATMs are the accessible locations in which they are placed.
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justify the risk of ATM crime and may require the bank to bear the burden of
implementing reasonable security measures.
After completing the balancing test, the jury should be instructed that, if it
finds that the burden on the bank and the social utility of the ATM service
outweigh the likelihood and the gravity of the harm, then it should find that the
defendant's actions were reasonable. Therefore, the bank would not have
breached its duty to protect the plaintiff. In the alternative, if the jury concludes
that the likelihood and the gravity of the harm outweigh the burden on the bank
and the social utility, then it should find that the bank breached its duty to the
ATM user. Therefore, the bank would be liable.
Although the proposed approach entrusts the jury with a great deal of
discretion, courts retain the power to remedy any potential abuse of discretion.
Should the court find that a jury abused its discretion, the court may direct a
verdict in favor of the bank, order a judgment notwithstanding the verdict,"
or order a new trial.'
In addition, if the court finds that the bank failed to
comply with its duty to the ATM user, but finds that the jury's assessment of
31
damages is excessive, the court may reduce the plaintiff's award .
Imposing a duty on banks to implement and improve safety measures at
ATMs will have a positive outcome for banks. Voluntarily installing security
measures should serve as a mitigating factor or as prima facie evidence that the
ATM operator provided adequate security measures. 312 Thus, the bank could
avoid costly litigation. Further, banks that install security measures will benefit
by gaining customer support for showing an interest in their welfare, and
creating a positive
image which could prove to be a useful marketing device for
3
the bank.

31

Fioravante, supra note 52, at 17 (quoting a director of First National Bank of Commerce who states
that the ATM provides the customer with the convenience of twenty-four hour access and useful
locations); Lipman, supra note 8, at 24 (reporting that the parking lot location provides customers
with easy access).
309. See generally FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 246, at 540-52 (discussing the judges' ability to
use directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict to control the jury).
310. Id. at 552-60 (discussing that a new trial motion gives a judge the opportunity to correct
errors).
311. Remnittitur is the procedure by which trial and appellate judges may reduce a jury verdict.
LAYCOCK, supra note 259, at 187.
312. See ILL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-305-20 (1994), supra note 79.
313. See Barthel, supra note 67, at 10.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss1/3

DeYoung: ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial Approach to a Bank's Liability

1995]

ATM CRIME

159

V11. CONCLUSION

In the past, courts have adopted a narrow approach to assess a bank's duty
in ATM crime cases. Under this narrow approach, courts have set rigid limits
on foreseeability.
Courts have conditioned foreseeability upon special
circumstances and have created high standards of foreseeability. The current
approach also improperly limits foreseeability. This approach has allowed
judges to set the standards for foreseeability. As a result, the judge has
encroached on the function of the jury. This result contradicts both public
policy and basic tort principles. Courts should broaden the current approach to
recognize that in some situations ATM crimes may be foreseeable and that in
these situations banks should-have a duty to protect ATM patrons.
Courts should use an approach which recognizes that evidence of prior
incidents related to the bank's premises may establish foreseeability and
ultimately duty. Under the approach suggested by this Note, the sufficiency of
prior related incidents to establish foreseeability of the present crime will be
determined by the jury. Before the judge rules on the issue of duty, the jury
will evaluate the prior incidents and make the factual findings necessary to
determine foreseeability. A duty will be imposed only when the jury finds that
the bank should have foreseen the ATM crime. Even if a duty is found,
however, liability will not automatically follow. The jury will then determine
whether the bank is liable by using a flexible balancing test which evaluates the
unique circumstances of the crime and the competing interests involved. The
proposed approach will allow courts to prevent banks from being unduly
burdened while still encouraging safety at ATMs.
Jennifer Juhala DeYoung
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